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Abstract
This work examines a novel question: how much randomness is needed to achieve local differential
privacy (LDP)? A motivating scenario is providing multiple levels of privacy to multiple analysts, either
for distribution or for heavy hitter estimation, using the same (randomized) output. We call this
setting successive refinement of privacy, as it provides hierarchical access to the raw data with different
privacy levels. For example, the same randomized output could enable one analyst to reconstruct the
input, while another can only estimate the distribution subject to LDP requirements. This extends the
classical Shannon (wiretap) security setting to local differential privacy. We provide (order-wise) tight
characterizations of privacy-utility-randomness trade-offs in several cases for distribution estimation,
including the standard LDP setting under a randomness constraint. We also provide a non-trivial privacy
mechanism for multi-level privacy. Furthermore, we show that we cannot reuse random keys over time
while preserving privacy of each user.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [DMNS06] – a cryptographically motivated notion of privacy – has recently emerged as the
gold standard in privacy-preserving data analysis. Privacy is provided by guaranteeing that the participation
of a single person in a dataset does not change the probability of any outcome by much; this is ensured by
randomness – either by adding noise to (or randomizing) the raw data itself or to a function or statistic
computed directly on the data. If the randomization is large enough relative to the change caused by a
single person’s data, then their participation is indistinguishable, and privacy is attained. An underlying
assumption in the body of work on differential privacy has long been that an unlimited amount of randomness
is available for use by any privacy mechanism. Under this assumption, the vast majority of the literature has
focused on achieving better privacy-utility trade-offs – see, for example, [DR14,SC13] for surveys. In this
paper, we ask: how much randomness do we need to achieve a desired level of privacy and utility, and study
privacy-utility-randomness trade-offs instead. Answering this question both contributes to our theoretical
understanding, and also could support specific emerging applications that we discuss later in the section.
We consider local differential privacy (LDP) – a privacy model that has recently seen use in industrial
applications, [EPK14, RAPPOR], [App17]. Here, an untrusted analyst acquires already-privatized pieces
of information from a number of users, and aggregates them into a statistic or a machine learning model.
Concretely, there are n users who observe i.i.d. inputs X1, X2, . . . , Xn (user i observes Xi) from a finite
alphabet X of size k, where each Xi is distributed according to a probability distribution p. Each user has a
certain amount of randomness, measured in Shannon entropy, to randomize her input, that she then publicly
shares. Our general setup also includes d analysts who would like to use the users’ public outputs to estimate
p, each at a different level of privacy 1, . . . , d, where smaller  means higher privacy. Each analyst may or
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Figure 1: We have n users, each observing a sample Xi. A private randomization mechanism Qi is applied to
Xi using a random key Ui. Two analysts want to estimate p. Each analyst requires a different privacy level.
may not share some common randomness with the users. We call this general setup successive refinement
of privacy, in which each user shares a public output with highest privacy level. Then, each analyst uses a
shared random key to partially undo the randomization of the public output to get less privacy and higher
utility.
This general formulation includes several interesting special cases, for which we study the trade-offs
between privacy, utility, and randomness. These are:
(i) There is a single analyst (d = 1), who shares no randomness with the users and estimates p with
privacy level . This setting directly generalizes the classical setup of LDP to the case of limited randomness.
(ii) There are two analysts (d = 2), who observe the same public outputs from the users; the first analyst
who shares common randomness with the users has permission to perfectly recover the original inputs (i.e.,
privacy level 1 →∞), while the second analyst who shares no randomness with the users estimates p with
privacy level 2. This setting is an adaptation of the classical perfect secrecy setup of Shannon [Sha49] to
the differential privacy world. In Shannon’s setup, Alice (users) wants to send a secret to Bob (the first
analyst), which must remain perfectly private from Eve (the second analyst); whereas, in our setting, instead
of complete independence, we only want that the secret remains hidden from Eve in the sense of differential
privacy. We call this setup private-recoverability.
(iii) There are d > 1 analysts, who share some common randomness with the users. Analyst i would like
to estimate p with privacy level i, where 1 > . . . > d.
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1.1 Motivation
In general, designing private mechanisms with a small amount of randomness can be translated into
communication efficiency and/or storage efficiency. For instance, when there are multiple privacy levels, each
user needs to send additional information to some analysts, that is a function of the randomness used in the
mechanism. Hence, using a smaller amount of randomness implies delivering a smaller number of bits to each
analyst.
The private-recoverability setup (d = 2) can be useful in applications such as census surveys, [Dwo19],
that collect large amounts of data and are prohibitively expensive to repeat. Using our approach, we can store
the randomized data on a public database (second analyst) without compromising the privacy of individuals;
we can also give to the first analyst (e.g., the government, who may wish to exactly calculate the population
count, or verify the validity of census results) a secret key, that can be used to “de-randomize” the publicly
stored data and perfectly reconstruct the user inputs. An alternative approach would be to store the data
twice (once randomized in a public database and once in a secure government database), which would incur
an additional storage cost, as also shown in Section 4. Another alternative would be to use a cryptographic
scheme to encode the user inputs; in this case, the resulting outputs may not allow public use in an efficient
manner.2
1We can assume, without loss of generality, that j > j+1, ∀j ∈ [d− 1]; otherwise, we can group the equal j ’s together and
the corresponding analysts can use the same privatized data that the users share with them.
2In principle, we could use homomorphic encryption that allows to compute a function on the encrypted data without
decrypting it explicitly; however, such encryption schemes are computationally inefficient and expensive to deploy.
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The multi-level privacy d > 1 illustrates a new technical capability of hierarchical access to the raw data
that might inspire and support a variety of applications. For example, given data collected from a fleet of
autonomous cars, we could imagine different privacy access levels provided to the car manufacturer itself,
to police departments, to applications interested in online traffic regulation, to applications interested in
long-term traffic predictions or road planning. Essentially, this capability enables providing the desired utility
needed for each application while maintaining the maximum possible amount of privacy.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows.
• For the single analyst case (d = 1), we characterize the trade-off between randomness and utility for a
fixed privacy level , by proving an information-theoretic lower bound and a matching upper bound for a
minimax private estimation problem.
• For private-recoverability (d = 2), we derive an information-theoretic lower bound on the minimum
randomness required to achieve it, and prove that the Hadamard scheme proposed in [ASZ19] is order optimal.
We also show that we cannot reuse random keys over time while preserving privacy of each user. Hence, to
preserve privacy of T samples, any -DP mechanism has to use an amount of randomness equal to T times the
amount of randomness used for a single data sample. We also extend this result to estimating heavy hitters.
• In the multi-level privacy (d > 1) setting, a trivial scheme is to use the d = 1 scheme multiple times,
separately for each analyst. We propose instead a non-trivial scheme that uses a smaller amount of randomness
with no sacrifice in utility. Our scheme publicly announces the users’ outputs, and allows each analyst to
remove an appropriate amount of (shared) randomness with the help of an associated key. This approach
enables efficient hierarchical access to the data (for example, when analysts have different levels of authorized
access).
Overall, our investigation into privacy-utility-randomness trade-offs for LDP yields (optimal) privacy
mechanisms that use randomness more economically. These include new guarantees for existing schemes
such as the Hadamard mechanism, as well as new multi-user and multi-level mechanisms that allow for
hierarchically private data access.
1.3 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the role of limited randomness has not been previously explored either in
the context of local or global differential privacy.3 In this work, we consider local differential privacy in the
context of distribution estimation and heavy hitter estimation for reasons of simplicity.
Popular local differentially private mechanisms for distribution estimation include RAPPOR [EPK14],
randomized response (RR) [War65]), subset selection (SS) [YB18,WHW+16], and the Hadamard response
(HR) [ASZ19]. The randomized response mechanism is known to be order optimal in the low privacy regime,
and the RAPPOR scheme in the high privacy regimes [KBR16,KOV14]. Subset selection and the Hadamard
mechanisms are order optimal in utility for all privacy regimes; additionally, the Hadamard mechanism has
the advantage of communication and computational efficiency for all privacy regimes [ASZ19]. We build
on this extensive literature, and show that the Hadamard mechanism is also near-optimal in terms of the
amount of randomness used.
Heavy hitter estimation under local differential privacy has been studied in [BS15, QYY+16, HKR12,
BNST17,BNS18], again with unrestricted randomness. Our work adds to this line of work by showing that
the Hadamard mechanism is capable of achieving order-optimal accuracy for heavy hitter estimation while
using an order-optimal amount of randomness.
Local differential privacy in a multi-user setting where the users and the server may have some shared
randomness has also been looked at in prior work – see [BS15, AS19, ACFT18] among others. These
works however investigate other orthogonal aspects of such multi-user protocols. Local differentially private
3Except for a notable exception of [DLMV12], which showed that imperfect source of randomness allows efficient protocols
with global differential privacy. This is different from our problem, where our goal is to quantify the amount of randomness
required (measured in terms of Shannon entropy) in local differential privacy and give privacy-utility-randomness trade-offs.
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mechanisms with bounded communication have also been studied by [AS19]; in their setup, multiple agents
transmit their data in a locally private manner to an aggregator, and communication is measured by the
number of bits transmitted by each user. They consider both private and public coin mechanisms, and
show that the Hadamard mechanism is near optimal in terms of communication for both distribution and
heavy-hitter estimation; however, unlike ours, their mechanisms do not impose any randomness constraints.
Our results in the multiple analyst setting are also related to privacy amplification by stochastic post-
processing [BBGG19] – which analyzes the privacy risk achieved by applying a (stochastic) post-processing
mechanism to the output of a differentially private algorithm. While these methods might also be used to
provide multi-level privacy to multiple analysts, our work is different from [BBGG19] in the following aspect.
First, their privacy amplification methodology does not apply to pure DP and applies instead to approximate
DP, while our work focuses on pure DP. Second, the work in [BBGG19] does not include a randomness
constraint, and finally, a closer look at their mechanism reveals that it does not use the optimal amount of
randomness.
Finally, a line of work on locally differentially private estimation considers the case when the inputs
comprise of i.i.d. samples from the same distribution. [DJW18,DR19] derive lower and upper bounds for
estimation under LDP in this setting – their work considers that all users observe i.i.d. samples from the same
distribution, and the goal for each user is to preserve privacy of its raw sample. Our work is also different
from this setting in that we focus on designing private mechanisms with finite randomness.
1.4 Paper organization
Section 2 formally defines LDP mechanisms under randomness constraints and presents the distribution and
heavy hitter estimation problem formulations. Section 3 states our main results for the single-level privacy,
private-recoverability, and multi-level privacy settings. Section 4 presents numerical evaluations on the effect
of parameters such as n, , d on the estimation error and the required randomness. Section 5 derives an
information-theoretic lower bound and an upper bound (achievability scheme) on the minimax risk estimation
under randomness and privacy constraints for a single analyst. Section 6 proposes a new LDP mechanism for
the multi-level privacy d > 1. Section 7 presents the necessary and sufficient conditions on the randomness to
design an -LDP mechanism with input recoverability requirement. Section 8 introduces the necessary and
sufficient conditions on the randomness to preserve privacy of a sequence of samples per user.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
Notation: We use [k] to define the set {1, . . . , k} of integers. We use uppercase letters X,Y , etc., to denote
random variables, and lowercase letter x, y, etc., to denote their realizations. For any two distributions p and
q supported over a set X , let ‖p− q‖TV = supA⊆X |p(A)− q(A)| be the total variation distance between p
and q. We use ⊕ to define the XOR operation. For p ∈ [0, 1], we use H2 (p) to denote the binary entropy
function defined by H2 (p) = −p log (p)− (1− p) log (1− p), and H (X) to denote the entropy of the random
variable X. Also, we use H (p) to denote the entropy of a random variable X drawn from a distribution p.
2.1 Differential Privacy (LDP)
Let X , {1, . . . , k} be an input alphabet and Y , {1, . . . ,m} be an output alphabet, of sizes |X | = k and
|Y| = m, respectively, that are not required to be the same. A private randomization mechanism Q is a
conditional distribution that takes an input X ∈ X and generates a privatized output Y ∈ Y. Q is said to
satisfy the -local differential privacy (-LDP) [DWJ13], if for every pair of inputs x, x′ ∈ X , we have
sup
y∈Y
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x′) ≤ exp () , (1)
where Q (y|x) = Pr [Y = y|X = x] and  captures the privacy level. For small values of , the adversary
cannot infer whether the input was X = x or X = x′. Hence, a smaller privacy level  implies higher privacy.
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Figure 2: An example of designing an -LDP mechanism using a private key: (left) representing the output Y
of the mechanism Q as a function of the input X and the private key U , (right) representing the mechanism
Q as a probabilistic mapping from the input X to the output Y depending on the private key U .
2.2 Randomness in LDP Mechanisms
A private mechanism Q with input X ∈ X and output Y ∈ Y is said to satisfy (, R)-LDP, if for every pair of
inputs x, x′ ∈ X , we have
sup
y∈Y
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x′) ≤ exp () , and
H (Y |X = x) ≤ R ∀x ∈ X ,
(2)
where H (Y |X = x) = ∑y∈Y Q (y|x) log ( 1Q(y|x)) denotes the entropy of the random output Y conditioned
on the input X = x. Note that an (, R)-LDP mechanism is an -LDP mechanism that requires an amount of
randomness less than or equal to R-bits to be designed.
Suppose that a random key U with H (U) ≤ R is used to design an (, R)-LDP mechanism Q. We consider
U to be a random variable that takes values from a discrete set U = {u1, . . . , ul} according to a distribution
q = [q1, . . . , ql], where qu = Pr [U = u] for u ∈ U . We assume that U is a discrete set, since we focus on finite
randomness. Let Uyx ⊂ U be a subset of key values such that input X = x is mapped to Y = y when u ∈ Uyx.
The private mechanism Q can be represented as
Q (y|x) =
∑
u∈Uyx
qu. (3)
Note that the output Y is a function of (X,U). Therefore, we have Uy′x
⋂Uyx = φ for y′ 6= y, since there is
only one output for each input. In addition, if we want (3) to satisfy the privacy condition (1), we also have4⋃
y∈Y Uyx = U for each x ∈ X . We will leverage this representation of randomness in LDP mechanisms to
design multi-level privacy mechanisms. Figure 3 shows an example of designing a private mechanism with
binary inputs X = {0, 1}, binary random keys U = {0, 1}, and binary outputs Y = {0, 1}. In this example,
we can represent the output of the mechanism as a function of (X,U) by Y = X ⊕ U , where ⊕ denotes the
XOR operation. If the random key U is drawn from a distribution q =
[
e
e+1 ,
1
e+1
]
, then it is easy to show
that the mechanism is -LDP.
2.3 Problem Formulation
We consider n users who observe i.i.d. inputs X1, X2, . . . , Xn (user i observes input Xi), drawn from
an unknown discrete distribution p ∈ ∆k, where ∆k =
{
p ∈ Rk|∑kj=1 pj = 1, pj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [k]} denotes
the probability simplex over X . The i’th user has a random key Ui with H (Ui) ≤ R; we assume that
Un = [U1, . . . , Un] are independent random variables, unless otherwise stated. The i’th user generates (and
4Otherwise we can distinguish inputs causing →∞.
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publicly shares) an output Yi, using an (, R)-LDP mechanism Qi and her random key Ui. The output Yi
has a marginal distribution given by
Mi (y|p) =
∑
x∈X
Qi (y|x) px ∀y ∈ Yi, (4)
where X and Yi are the input and output alphabets. We also have d analysts who want to use the users’
public outputs Y n = [Y1, . . . , Yn] to estimate p, each at a different level of privacy 1 > . . . > d. The system
model is shown in Figure 1.
Risk Minimization: For simplicity of exposition, consider for now a single analyst, and let pˆ =
[pˆ1, · · · , pˆk] denote the analyst’s estimator (this is a function pˆ : Y n → Rk that maps the outputs Y n to
a distribution in the simplex ∆k)
5. For given private mechanisms Qn = [Q1, . . . , Qn], the estimator pˆ is
obtained by solving the problem
r`,R,n,k (Q
n) = inf
pˆ
sup
p∈∆k
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,p)] , (5)
where r`,R,n,k is the minimax risk, the expectation is taken over the randomness in the outputs Y
n =
[Y1, . . . , Yn] with Yi ∼Mi, and ` : Rk × Rk → R+ is a loss function that measures the distance between two
distributions in ∆k. Unless otherwise stated, we adopt as loss function the 1-norm, namely ` = `1 and the
squared 2-norm, namely ` = `22. Our task is to design private mechanisms Q1, . . . , Qn that minimize the
minimax risk estimation, namely,
r`,R,n,k = inf{Qi∈Q(,R)}
r`,R,n,k (Q
n)
= inf
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
inf
pˆ
sup
p∈∆k
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,p)] ,
(6)
whereQ(,R) denotes the set of mechanisms that satisfy (, R)-LDP. Observe that whenR→∞, the problem (6)
is reduced to the standard LDP distribution estimation studied previously in [DWJ13,KBR16,YB18,ASZ19].
The difference in the formulation in (6) is the randomness constraint.
LDP heavy hitter estimation: In heavy hitter estimation, the input samples Xn = [X1, . . . , Xn] do
not have an associated distribution. Furthermore, the analyst is interested in estimating the frequency of
each element x ∈ X with the infinity norm being the loss function (i.e., ` = `∞). Frequency of each element
x ∈ X is defined by f (x) =
∑n
i=1 1(Xi=x)
n . We then want to calculate
r`∞hh,,R,n,k = inf{Qi∈Q(,R)}
inf
pˆ
sup
Xn∈Xn
E
[
max
x∈X
|pˆx (Y n)− f (x) |
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the outputs Y n = [Y1, . . . , Yn] and pˆ denotes the
estimator of the analyst. Note, again, that in this case we do not make any distributional assumptions on
X1, . . . , Xn.
Multi-level privacy: Consider now the general case of d analysts each operating at a different level of
privacy 1 > . . . > d. All analysts observe the users’ public outputs Y
n; additionally, analyst j may also
observe some side information on the user randomness. The question we ask is: what is the minimum amount
of randomness U per user required to maintain the privacy of each user while achieving the minimum risk
estimation for each analyst?
Sequence of distribution (or heavy hitter) estimation: We assume that each user i has a random
key Ui to preserve the privacy of a sequence of T independent samples X
(1)
i , . . . , X
(T )
i , where the t’th samples
for t ∈ [T ] at all users are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution p(t).6 At time t, the i’th user generates
5Observe that it is sufficient to consider a deterministic estimator pˆ, since for any randomized estimator, there exists a
deterministic estimator that dominates the performance of the randomized one.
6As mentioned earlier, for heavy hitter estimation, the samples X
(1)
i , . . . , X
(T )
i do not have an associated distribution.
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an output Y
(t)
i that may be a function of the random key Ui and all input samples {X(m)i }tm=1. Each of the
d analysts uses the outputs Y
(t)
i , i ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ] to estimate T distributions p(1), . . . ,p(T ) (or estimate the
heavy hitters).
A private mechanism Q with a sequence of inputs XT =
(
X(1), . . . , X(T )
)
and a sequence of outputs
Y T =
(
Y (1), . . . , Y (T )
)
is said to satisfy -DP, if for every neighboring databases x,x′ ∈ X T , we have
sup
y∈YT
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x′) ≤ exp () , (7)
where Q (y|x) = Pr [Y T = y|XT = x]; and we say that two databases, x = (x(1), . . . , x(T )) and x′ =(
x′(1), . . . , x′(T )
) ∈ X T are neighboring, if there exists an index t ∈ [T ], such that x(t) 6= x′(t) and x(l) = x′(l)
for l 6= t. Observe that when T = 1, the definition of -DP in (7) coincides with the definition of -LDP in (1).
We are interested in the question: Is there a private mechanism that uses a smaller amount of randomness
than T times the amount of randomness used for a single data sample? In other words, can we perhaps reuse
the randomness over time while preserving privacy?
3 Main Results
This section formally presents our main results. First, we characterize the minimax risk estimation under
randomness and privacy constraints in Theorems 1 and 2 for single-level privacy (d = 1). Then, we propose in
Theorem 3 a new LDP privacy mechanism that provides a hierarchical access to users’ samples with different
privacy levels (multi-level privacy d > 1). We present in Theorem 4 the necessary and sufficient conditions on
the randomness to design an LDP mechanism with input recoverability requirement. Finally, we present in
Theorem 6 the necessary and sufficient conditions on the randomness to preserve privacy of a sequence of
samples under a recoverability constraint.
3.1 Single-level Privacy, d = 1
We here study the fundamental trade-off between randomness and utility for a fixed privacy level . In the
following theorem, we derive a lower bound on the minimax risk estimation r
`22
,R,n,k and r
`1
,R,n,k defined in (6).
Theorem 1. For every , R ≥ 0 and k, n ∈ N, the minimax risk under `2-norm loss is bounded by
r
`22
,R,n,k ≥ τ =

k(e+1)2
16ne(e−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
ke
16np2R(e
−1)2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
(8)
where pR ≤ 0.5 is the inverse of the binary entropy function pR = H−12 (R). The minimax risk under 1-norm
loss is bounded by r`1,R,n,k ≥
√
kτ/8.
The main contribution in our proof (see Section 5.1) is a formulation of a non-convex optimization problem
to bound the minimax risk under privacy and randomness constraints, and obtaining a tight bound on its
solution for every value of privacy level  and randomness R.
Remark 1. In [YB18], the authors derive the following lower bound on the minimax risk estimation without
randomness constraints (R→∞)
r
`22
,∞,n,k ≥
{
k(e+1)2
512n(e−1)2 for e
 < 3,
k
64n(e−1) for e
 ≥ 3. (9)
For  = O(1) and R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
(which includes R→∞ as well), our lower bound from Theorem 1 gives
r
`22
,R,n,k = Ω
(
k
n2
)
, which coincides with (9). However, our lower bound is tighter for all values of  ∈ [0,∞)
with smaller constant factors.
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RAPPOR RR HR BH
Randomness per user (R in bits) kH2
(
e
e+1
)
log (k − 1 + e)− ek−1+e ≤ log
(
2k 3e
−1
e
)− e3e−1 H2 ( ee+1)
Minimax risk (r
`22
,R,n,k) O
(
k
n2
) O ( k2n2) O ( kn2 ) O ( kn2 )
Table 1: Randomness requirement to implement each private mechanism and its corresponding minimax risk
under `22 loss function for  = O (1).
We next show that there exists an achievable scheme for all values of , R ≥ 0 that matches (up to a
constant factor) the lower bound given in Theorem 1 for  = O (1) and R ≥ 0.
Theorem 2. For any , R ≥ 0, there exists (, R)-LDP mechanisms Q1, . . . , Qn and an estimator pˆ such
that the error E := supp∈∆k E
[‖pˆ (Y n)− p‖22] is bounded by
E ≤ η =

2k(e+1)2
n(e−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
2ke2
np2R(e
−1)2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
.
(10)
The error under `1-norm loss is bounded by supp∈∆k E [‖pˆ (Y n)− p‖1] ≤
√
kη.
We prove Theorem 2 constructively in Section 5.2, by adapting the Hadamard response scheme given
in [AS19] to our setting of limited randomness. Theorems 1 and 2 together imply the following characterization
for r
`22
,R,n,k and r
`1
,R,n,k, for the case when  = O(1):
Corollary 1. For  = O (1) and R ≥ 0, we have
r
`22
,R,n,k =
Θ
(
k
n2
)
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
Θ
(
k
np2R
2
)
if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
(11)
and r`1,R,n,k =
√
kr
`22
,R,n,k.
We next provide a comparison between well-known mechanisms from randomness perspective. Table 1
describe the amount of randomness required to implement different -LDP mechanisms: RAPPOR [EPK14],
Randomized Response (RR) [War65], Hadamard Response (HR) [ASZ19], and Binary Hadamard (BH) [AS19].
Observe that all private mechanisms are order optimal in the high privacy regime except for the RR scheme.
However, only the BH scheme uses the smallest amount of randomness R = H2
(
e
e+1
)
per user, while the
other mechanisms require a larger amount of randomness. Table 1 considers only the regime of randomness
R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
, since the privacy-utility trade-off when the amount of randomness R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
has not
been studied before. Corollary 1 characterizes the privacy-utility trade-offs for all regions of randomness R.
Remark 2. Observe that when R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
, there exists a trade-off between R and r
`22
,R,n,k – as R
increases, r
`22
,R,n,k decreases proportionally to 1/p
2
R. However, when R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
, the minimax risk is not
affected by R. Hence, R = H2
(
e
e+1
)
is a critical point that defines the minimum amount of randomness
required for each user to generate an -LDP mechanism, while achieving the optimal utility at the analyst.
Remark 3. Corollary 1 also characterizes the number of users n (sample complexity) required to estimate
the distribution p with estimation error at most α for given privacy level  and randomness R bits per user is
(where k is the input alphabet size):
n =
Θ
(
k
α2
)
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
Θ
(
k
αp2R
2
)
if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
.
(12)
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A remark analogous to Remark 2 also holds here.
3.2 Multi-level Privacy, d > 1
Here, we study the case of d different analysts, with privacy levels 1 > · · · > d, and j = O (1) for j ∈ [d].
A trivial scheme is to use the d = 1 scheme multiple times, separately for each analyst: each user i ∈ [n]
generates d samples
(
Y 1i , . . . , Y
d
i
)
from its input sample Xi. The jth sample Y
j
i is delivered privately to the
jth analyst. Note that the jth sample must be generated from an j-LDP. It then follows from Corollary 1
that the minimum risk for the jth analyst is given by r
`22
j ,∞,n,k = Θ
(
k
n2j
)
, which requires each user to have
Rj ≥ H2
(
ej
ej+1
)
bits of randomness, and results in a total amount of randomness
Rtrivialtotal =
d∑
j=1
H2
(
ej
ej + 1
)
.
We propose a new scheme, in which each user generates a single output that is publicly accessible by all
analysts; each analyst is given a part of the random key that was used to privatize the data, and leverages
this key to reduce the perturbation of the public output. The next theorem is proved in Section 6.
Theorem 3. There exists a private mechanism using a total amount of randomness given by Rproposedtotal =∑d
j=1H2 (qj), such that the jth analyst achieves the minimum risk estimation r
`22
j ,∞,n,k = Θ
(
k
n2j
)
, while
preserving privacy of each user with privacy level j for j ∈ [d]. Here, for every j ∈ [d], qj is defined as
follows (where zj =
1
ej+1
):
qj =
{
zj if j = 1,
zj−zj−1
1−2zj−1 if j > 1.
(13)
Remark 4. Note that zj > zj−1 as j−1 > j . Moreover, we also have zj = 1/ (ej + 1) < 0.5 for all j ∈ [d].
As a result, we can show that for j > 1, we have
qj =
zj − zj−1
1− 2zj−1 = zj −
zj−1 (1− 2zj)
1− 2zj−1 < zj . (14)
Hence, we get that H2 (qj) < H2 (zj) holds for all j > 1. Therefore, our proposed scheme uses a strictly
smaller amount of randomness than the trivial scheme.
3.3 Private Recoverability, d = 2
We here consider a legitimate analyst with permission to access the data {Xi}ni=1, i.e., 1 → ∞, and an
untrusted analyst with privacy level 2 <∞. The ith user uses a random private key Ui and her mechanism
Qi to generate an output Yi that is publicly accessible by both analysts.
Definition 1 (LDP-Rec mechanisms). We say that a private mechanism Q is -LDP-Rec, if it is an
-LDP mechanism and it is possible to recover the input X from output Y and the key U .
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the random keys {Ui} and the mechanisms {Qi}, such
that the legitimate analyst can recover Xi from observing Ui and Yi, while preserving privacy level 2 against
the untrusted analyst who does not have access to the keys.
We first consider a simplified setting as shown in Figure 3. Alice (an arbitrary user 7) has a sample X ∈ X .
Alice wants to send her sample X to Bob (the legitimate analyst) while keeping her sample X private against
Eve (the untrusted analyst) with differential privacy level . Eve has access to the message between Alice
7Since the input samples X1, . . . , Xn are i.i.d., and the random keys U1, . . . , Un are independent random variables, it is
sufficient to study the private-recoverable mechanism for any single user.
9
𝑌 𝑋
𝑈
Alice
𝑄
Eve
𝑋
Bob
Figure 3: Private-Recoverability: Alice has data X. An -LDP-Rec mechanism Q is applied to X using a
random key U to generate output Y . Bob is capable to recover X from Y and U . Eve only observes Y .
and Bob. However, Alice has a random key U shared with Bob that Eve does not have access to. Let Y be
the output of the private mechanism Q used by Alice. The following theorem (which we prove in Section 7.1)
provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the random key U and the privatized output Y to generate an
-LDP-Rec mechanism.
Remark 5. Observe that in the simplified model in Figure 3, we do not impose any assumptions on the input
X. Furthermore, we do not impose any assumptions about the task for Eve. Hence, our model and results in
Theorem 4 are applicable to any task for Eve including distribution estimation, heavy hitter estimation, or
learning from sample X.
Theorem 4. Let Q be an -LDP-Rec mechanism that uses a random key U ∈ U and an input X ∈ X to
produce a privatized output Y ∈ Y. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient to allow recovery of
X from (U, Y ):
(1) |U| ≥ |Y| ≥ |X |.
(2) The entropy of the random key must satisfy H (U) ≥ H (Us∗min), where s∗ = arg min
s∈{dle,blc}
H (Usmin)
for l = k e
(−1)+1
(e−1)2 and U
s
min is a random variable with support size equal to |X | = k and has the following
distribution:
qsmin = [1/t, . . . , 1/t, e
/t, . . . , e/t],
where t = (se + k − s), the first k − s terms are equal to 1/t and the remaining s terms are equal to e/t.
We now discuss the effect of  on the structure of optimal distribution qs
∗
min for U
s∗
min: (i) When  log(k),
the optimal s∗ = 1, and the corresponding q1min has its first k − 1 terms equal to 1/(e + k − 1) and the last
term equal to e/(e + k − 1). This distribution is equivalent to the one used in the Randomized Response
(RR) model proposed in [War65]. (ii) When  → 0, the optimal s∗ is around k/2, and the corresponding
q
k/2
min has its first k/2 terms equal to 2/k(e
 + 1) and the remaining k/2 terms equal to 2e/k(e + 1). (iii)
When  = 0, the distribution qsmin becomes uniform (irrespective of the value of s). Thus, when  decreases,
the distribution qsmin approaches to the uniform distribution. On the other hand, when  increases, the
distribution qsmin becomes skewed. It turns out that the minimum randomness required to generate an
-LDP-Rec mechanism for input recoverability is a non-increasing function of . In other words, more privacy
requires more randomness.
Remark 6. Consider the cryptosystem introduced by Shannon in [Sha49], where Alice wants to send a secure
message X to Bob using a shared random key U . Let Y be the encrypted message sent to Bob. Eve eavesdrops
the channel between Alice and Bob and observes Y . This cryptosystem achieves perfect secrecy if and only if
I (X;Y ) = 0. Shannon showed that perfect secrecy requires H (U) ≥ H (X). Since the distribution of X is
not known to any node (Alice, Bob, and Eve), this implies H (U) ≥ maxpX∈∆k H(X) = log k. We can easily
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verify that the -LDP-Rec mechanism satisfies a cryptosystem with secrecy measure maxp∈∆k I (X;Y ) ≤ .
Hence, a perfect secrecy system with unknown input distribution is a 0-LDP-Rec mechanism, which is a
special case of our problem. Moreover, the -LDP-Rec mechanism with data recovery is a cryptosystem
leaking an amount of information measured by maxp∈∆k I (X;Y ) ≤ .
Observe that Theorem 4 does not provide performance guarantees for Eve, it only guarantees privacy
for Alice with respect to Eve, and recoverability for Bob. Hence, we can ask the question: Does there exist
an -LDP-Rec mechanism using the smallest amount of randomness and guaranteeing the smallest error for
distribution estimation or heavy hitter estimation for Eve (the untrusted analyst)? In the following theorem
(which we prove in Section 7.2), we show that such a mechanism exists.
Theorem 5. The Hadamard Response mechanism from [ASZ19] satisfies private-recoverability, and is
utility-wise order-optimal for distribution estimation and heavy hitter estimation while using an order-optimal
amount of randomness.
3.4 Sequence of Distribution (or Heavy Hitter) Estimation
We again start from the setting in Figure 3, but with the modification that Alice (an arbitrary user) wants to
send to Bob (a legitimate analyst) T independent samples XT =
(
X(1), . . . , X(T )
)
, where X(t) ∈ X , while
keeping them private against Eve (an untrusted analyst) with differential privacy level . Eve has access to
the sequence of outputs Y T =
(
Y (1), . . . , Y (T )
)
that Alice produces, but not to the random key U that Alice
and Bob share. Note that each output Y (t) might be a function of all input samples Xt1 =
(
X(1), . . . , X(t)
)
and the key U . Furthermore, the output Y (t) can take values from a set Y(t) that is not required to be the
same as Y(t′) for t 6= t′. Let YT = Y(1) × · · · × Y(T ). The following theorem is proved in Section 8.
We can define -DP-Rec mechanisms in the same way as we defined -LDP-Rec mechanisms in Definition 1:
A mechanism Q is -DP-Rec, if it satisfies (7), and allows the recovery of input X from the output Y and the
key U .
Theorem 6. Let Q be an -DP-Rec mechanism that uses a random key U ∈ U and an input database
XT ∈ X T to create an output Y T ∈ YT . The following conditions are necessary and sufficient to allow
recovery of the input XT from (U, Y T ).
(1) |U| ≥ |YT | ≥ |X T |.
(2) The entropy of the random key must satisfy H (U) ≥ T min
s∗∈{dle,blc}
H
(
Us
∗
min
)
, where Usmin is the same
random variable with support size |X | = k, as defined in Theorem 4.
Theorem 6 shows that the minimum amount of randomness required to preserve privacy of T samples
is equal to T times the amount of randomness required to preserve privacy of a single sample. That is, for
-DP-Rec, it is optimal to use an -LDP-Rec mechanism T times.
Remark 7. Observe that Theorem 6 is applicable in a n-user setting (by setting T = n), where user i has a
single sample X(i), and all users have access to a shared random key U . So we have that shared randomness
among users does not help in reducing the overall required amount of randomness.
4 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we numerically validate our theoretical results through simulation.
Single-level privacy: In this part, we investigate the performance of the estimator presented in
Theorem 2 for a single-level privacy. Each point is obtained by averaging over 20 runs. In Figure 4a, we plot
the estimation error for the ` = `1 loss function (‖p− pˆ (Y n) ‖1) for estimating a discrete distribution p ∈ ∆k.
The input size is k = 1000, the number of users is n ∈ [105 : 106], and the privacy level is  = 1 for two
values of randomness R ∈ {0.7, 1} bits per user. The input samples are drawn from a Geometric distribution
with parameter q = 0.8 (Geo (0.8)), in which pi = Cq
i−1 (1− q) for i ∈ [k], where C is a normalization
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Figure 5: Multi-level privacy
term. Figure 4a shows that the number of users required to achieve a certain estimation error increases as
the amount of randomness per user decreases. For instance, to achieve an `1-error equal to 1.4, we need
n ≈ 150, 000 users if R = 1 bits per user, while we need n ≈ 850, 000 users if R = 0.7 bits per user.
Figure 4b depicts the `1 estimation error as a function of the privacy level  for input size k = 1000
and number of users n = 500000 for two different values of randomness R ∈ {1, 0.6} bits per user. As we
discussed in Theorem 1, for each privacy level , there is a critical point of randomness R = H (e/ (e + 1)).
When each user has R < H (e/ (e + 1)) bits of randomness, then the `1 estimation loss increases as the
randomness R decreases. While when each user has R ≥ H (e/ (e + 1)) bits of randomness, the estimation
error is not affected by the amount of randomness R. In Figure 4b, we find that the `1 error depends on the
randomness R for all  < 0.8, since we have R = 0.9 < H (e/ (e + 1)) for all  < 0.8.
Multi-level privacy: Figure 5a and Figure 5b compare our proposed scheme in Theorem 3 with the
trivial scheme with respect to the total amount of randomness used. In the trivial scheme, each user generates
d different privatized samples, one for each analyst. In Figure 5a we consider two privacy levels 1 = 1 and
2 ≤ 1. We find that when 1 − 2 is small, then the trivial scheme requires approximately twice the total
amount of randomness used in our scheme. However, when 1 − 2 is large, then our scheme and the trivial
scheme use similar amounts of randomness. In Figure 5b, we consider d ∈ [1 : 10], 1 = 2 and j = 1 − 0.1j,
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for j ∈ {2, . . . , d}. We find that the gap between the amount of randomness used in our scheme and the
trivial scheme increases with d.
Private-recoverability: Observe that each user needs log (k) bits to store her input sample X ∈ [k],
since she does not know the distribution X ∼ p. In private-recoverability, we can recover X from observing Y
and U ; hence, we only need to store U . Figure 6 plots the number of bits required to store U (see Theorem 4)
as a function of the privacy level  and different values of input size k ∈ {10, 100, 1000}. The black lines
represent the log (k) bits required to store X (an additional secure copy). Note that the amount of bits
needed to store U is strictly smaller than log (k) for  > 0, and decreases as the privacy level  increases.
Observe that the gain in Fig 6 is per user. Hence, the total amount of saving in storage would be considerable
when the number of users is large and  > 0. For example, when  = 5, alphabet size k = 2, 4, 10, we get gain
in efficiency log(k)−H(U)log(k) of 94.2%, 91.4%, and 85% respectively.
5 Single-level Privacy (Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2)
5.1 Lower Bound on The Minimax Risk Estimation Using Assouad’s Method
Now we prove the lower bound on the minimax risk given in Theorem 1 (see page 7). We first follow
similar steps as in [DJW18, YB18] to reduce the minimax problem into multiple binary testing problems
using Assouad’s method. We note that [DJW18, YB18] do not consider a randomness constraint. Hence,
we formulate an optimization problem to obtain a lower bound on the minimax risk estimation with a
randomness constraint. Finding a tight bound on the solution of this problem is the main step in our proof.
We also provide an alternative proof of Theorem 1 by using Fisher information, which leads to a tight bound
for ` = `22 with smaller constant factors (see Appendix A).
Let |X | = k be the input alphabet size. Let {pν} be a set of distributions parameterized by ν =(
ν1, . . . , νk/2
) ∈ V = {−1, 1}k/2. The distribution pν = (pν1 , . . . , pνk) is given by:
pνj =
{
1
k + δνj if j ∈ {1, . . . , k/2}
1
k − δνj−k/2 if j ∈ {k/2 + 1, . . . , k}
, (15)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/k is a parameter that will be chosen later. Let Y n = [Y1, . . . , Yn] and Yn = Y1 × · · · × Yn.
Following [DJW18], for any loss function ` (pˆ,p) =
∑k
j=1 φ (pˆj − pj), where φ : R → R+ is a symmetric
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function, we have8
` (pˆ (yn) ,pν) =
k∑
j=1
φ
(
pˆj (y
n)− pνj
) ≥ φ (δ) k/2∑
j=1
1
(
sgn
(
pˆj (y
n)− 1
k
)
6= νj
)
, (16)
where sgn (x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and sgn (x) = 0 otherwise. Suppose that user i chooses a private mechanism
Qi ∈ Q(,R) that generates an output Yi ∈ Yi. Let Mνi be the output distribution on Yi for an input
distribution pν on X defined by
Mνi (y) =
k∑
j=1
Qi (y|Xi = j) pνj . (17)
Let Mn+j and M
n
−j denote the marginal distribution on Yn conditioned on νj = +1 and νj = −1, respectively,
where
Mn+j (y
n) =
1
|V|
∑
ν:νj=+1
n∏
i=1
Mνi (yi)
Mn−j (y
n) =
1
|V|
∑
ν:νj=−1
n∏
i=1
Mνi (yi) .
Thus, the minimax risk can be bounded using the following lemma whose proof is presented in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. For the family of distributions
{
pν : ν ∈ V = {−1, 1}k/2}, and a loss function ` (pˆ,p) =∑k
j=1 φ (pˆj − pj) defined above, we have
r`,R,n,k ≥ φ (δ)
k
2
1−√n
2
sup
j∈[k/2]
sup
i∈[n]
sup
ν:νj=1
sup
Qi∈Q(,R)
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
) (18)
Fix arbitrary i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k/2] and ν ∈ V. We have
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
) (a)
≤ DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
+DKL
(
M
ν−2ej
i ||Mνi
)
(19)
=
∑
y∈Yi
(
Mνi (y)−Mν−2eji (y)
)
log
(
Mνi (y)
M
ν−2ej
i (y)
)
(b)
≤
∑
y∈Yi
(
Mνi (y)−Mν−2eji (y)
)2
M
ν−2ej
i (y)
(c)
=
∑
y∈Yi
δ2
(Qi (y|j)−Qi (y|j + k/2))2∑k
j′=1Qi (y|j′) pν−2ejj′
(d)
≤ 2δ2e
∑
y∈Yi
(Qi (y|j)−Qi (y|j + k/2))2
Qi (y|j) +Qi (y|j + k/2) , (20)
where step (a) follows from the fact that DKL (.||.) is not negative. Step (b) follows from the inequality
log (x) ≤ x − 1. Step (c) follows from the definition of Mνi in (17). Step (d) follows from bounding the
denominator as follows:
k∑
j′=1
Qi (y|j′) pν−2ejj′ ≥ e−
Qi (y|j) +Qi (y|j + k/2)
2
k∑
j′=1
p
ν−2ej
j′
= e−
Qi (y|j) +Qi (y|j + k/2)
2
,
(21)
where we use the fact that Qi (y|j′) ≥ e−Qi (y|j) and Qi (y|j′) ≥ e−Qi (y|j + k/2) , ∀j′ ∈ [k].
8Observe that for loss function ` = `22, we have φ (x) = x
2, and for loss function ` = `1, we have φ (x) = |x|.
14
Lemma 2. For any randomized mechanism Q ∈ Q(,R) that generates an output Y ∈ Y, we have
sup
Q∈Q(,R)
∑
y∈Y
(Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2))2
Q (y|j) +Q (y|j + k/2) ≤
 2
(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2
p2R(e
−1)2
e2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (22)
This lemma presents an upper bound on equation (20) as a function of the randomness R for any private
mechanism Q ∈ Q(,R). To prove this lemma, we first show that the optimization problem (22) is non-convex
due to the randomness constraint. We then prove that the maximum value of this function (22) is obtained
when the output of the mechanism Q ∈ Q(,R) is binary. Then, we obtain a tight bound numerically for the
binary output.
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality assume that Y = {y1, . . . , ym} with |Y| = m. For ease of
notation, we write Q (yl|j) = ql,j and Q (yl|j + k/2) = ql,j+k/2. The problem (22) can be formulated as
follows
P1: max
{ql,j ,ql,j+k/2}ml=1
m∑
l=1
(
ql,j − ql,j+k/2
)2
ql,j + ql,j+k/2
(23)
s.t. H ([q1,j , . . . , qm,j ]) ≤ R, H
([
q1,j+k/2, . . . , qm,j+k/2
]) ≤ R (24)
e− ≤ ql,j
ql,j+k/2
≤ e, ∀l ∈ [m]
ql,j ≥ 0, ql,j+k/2 ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ [m]
m∑
l=1
ql,j = 1,
m∑
l=1
ql,j+k/2 = 1
Note that the objective function (23) is jointly convex in both {ql,j}ml=1 and {ql,j+k/2}ml=1. However, the
optimization problem P1 is non-convex due to two reasons. First, we maximize a convex function, and second
the entropy constraints (24) are sub-level sets of a concave function and are non-convex constraints. However,
we can solve the optimization problem P1 by exploiting the results of Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3. The optimal solution of the non-convex optimization problem P1 is obtained when the output
size is m = 2.
The proof of Lemma 3 is presented in Appendix C. Since the output alphabet is binary, we can efficiently
plot the feasible region of P1 for m = 2 as depicted in Figure 7. Since we maximize a convex function, the
optimal solution is at the boundary of the feasible set. Furthermore, the objective function (23) is symmetric
on q1,j , q1,j+k/2 for m = 2. As a result, the optimal solution is given by.
q∗1,j =

e
e+1 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
pR if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) , q∗1,j+k/2 =

1
e+1 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
pR
e if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) , (25)
where q∗2,j = 1− q∗1,j , and q∗2,j+k/2 = 1− q∗1,j+k/2. Substituting from (25) into the objective function (23), we
get
m∑
l=1
(
ql,j − ql,j+k/2
)2
ql,j + ql,j+k/2
≤
 2
(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2
p2R(e
−1)2
e2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (26)
Hence, the proof is completed for Lemma 2. 
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Figure 7: The feasible region of the optimization problem P1 for m = 2. In (a), we have R = 0.5 < H2
(
e
e+1
)
for  = 1, and hence the optimal point is one of the black points. In (b), we have R = 0.85 > H2
(
e
e+1
)
for
 = 1, and hence the optimal point is one of the black vertices.
Using the bound from Lemma 2 in (20) and taking supremum over all Qi ∈ Q,R, we get
sup
Qi∈Q(,R)
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
≤ 2δ2e sup
Qi∈Q(,R)
∑
y∈Yi
(Qi (y|j)−Qi (y|j + k/2))2
Qi (y|j) +Qi (y|j + k/2)
= 2δ2e
 2
(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2
p2R(e
−1)2
e2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (27)
Substituting from (27) into (18), we get
r`,R,n,k ≥

φ (δ) k2
(
1−
√
2δ2ne (e
−1)2
(e+1)2
)
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
φ (δ) k2
(
1−
√
2δ2n
p2R(e
−1)2
e
)
if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (28)
By setting δ2 = (e
+1)2
8ne(e−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
and δ2 = e

8np2R(e
−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
, we get
r`,R,n,k ≥

φ
(√
(e+1)2
8ne(e−1)2
)
k
4 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
φ
(√
e
8np2R(e
−1)2
)
k
4 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (29)
For the loss function ` = `22, we set φ (x) = x
2 and for ` = `1, we set φ (x) = |x|. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1 with a slightly worse constant of 32 instead of 16 in the denominator. We provide a different proof
of Theorem 1 in Appendix A using Fisher information that gives the exact bound as stated in Theorem 1.
5.2 Upper Bound on The Minimax Risk Estimation Using Hadamard Response
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 (see page 8) by proposing a private mechanism by adapting the Hadamard
response given in [AS19], where each user answers to a yes-no question such that the probability of telling
the truth depends on the amount of randomness R. Each user i ∈ [n] has a binary output Yi ∈ {0, 1}. The
(, R)-LDP mechanism of the i-th user is defined by
Q (Yi = 1|X) =
{
q if X ∈ Bi
q
e if X /∈ Bi
(30)
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where Bi ⊂ [k] is a subset of inputs, and q is a probability value that will be determined later such that
H2 (q) ≤ R. Let K = 2dlog(k)e denote the smallest power of 2 larger than k, and HK be the K×K Hadamard
matrix. In the following, we assume an extended distribution p over the set X = [K] with |X | = K
that is obtained by zero-padding the original distribution p with (K − k) zeros, i.e., p = [p1, . . . , pK ] =
[p1, . . . , pk, 0, . . . , 0]. For j ∈ [K], let Bj be a set of row indices that have 1 in the j-th column of the
Hadamard matrix HK . For example, when K = 4, the Hadamard matrix is given by
H4 =

1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1
 (31)
Hence, B1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, B2 = {1, 3}, B3 = {1, 2}, and B4 = {1, 4}. We divide the users into K sets
(US1, . . . ,USK), where each set contains n/K users. For each user i ∈ USj , we set Bi = Bj . Let
p
(
Bj
)
= Pr
[
X ∈ Bj] = ∑x∈Bj px, and sj = Pr [Yi = 1] for i ∈ Uj . Then, we can easily see that
sj = p
(
Bj
)
q +
(
1− p (Bj)) q
e
= p
(
Bj
)
q
(
e − 1
e
)
+
q
e
(32)
Let sˆj =
1
|USj |
∑
i∈USj 1 {Yi = 1} denote the estimate of sj . Then, we can estimate p
(
Bj
)
as pˆ
(
Bj
)
=
e
q(e−1)
(
sˆj − qe
)
. Observe that the relation between the distribution p and p (B) =
[
p
(
B1
)
, . . . , p
(
BK
)]
is
given by [AS19, Eq. 13]
p (B) =
HKp + 1K
2
, (33)
where 1K denotes a vector of K ones. Hence, we can estimate the distribution p as
pˆ = H−1K (2pˆ (B)− 1K) =
1
K
HK (2pˆ (B)− 1K) . (34)
Lemma 4. For arbitrary p ∈ ∆k, we have
E
[‖p− pˆ‖22] ≤ 2ke2
nq2 (e − 1)2 . (35)
The proof is exactly the same as the proof in [AS19, Theorem 5]. By setting q = e

e+1 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
and q = pR if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
, we get
r
`22
,R,n,k ≤

2k(e+1)2
n(e−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
,
2ke2
np2R(e
−1)2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
.
(36)
The difference in our mechanism is that we design the private mechanism (30) for all values of randomness R.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
6 Multi-level Privacy (Proof of Theorem 3)
This section proves Theorem 3 (see page 9) by establishing a new technique using a smaller amount of
randomness than the trivial scheme mentioned in Section 3.2 while achieving the minimum risk estimation
for each analyst. Our proposed mechanism for multi-level privacy (where 1 > . . . > d) is a cascading
mechanism, where in each step, we add a random key to the output of the previous step (see Figure 8, for
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Figure 8: Multiple privacy levels mechanism.
example). The common output of the mechanism is accessible by all analysts. However, each analyst would
have a different privacy level depending on the amount of randomness shared with it. Thus, each analyst
uses the shared random key to partially undo the randomization of the common output to get less privacy
and higher utility. Let zj =
1
ej+1
for j ∈ [d]. For i ∈ [n], let {U1i , . . . , Udi } be a set of d Bernoulli random
variables, where U ji has a parameter qj = Pr
[
U ji = 1
]
given by
qj =
{
zj if j = 1,
zj−zj−1
1−2zj−1 if j > 1.
(37)
We first use the Hadamard response proposed in [AS19] for getting the first step of our mechanism (see
Section 5.2 for more details). Let HK be the K ×K Hadamard matrix. Let Bl be a set of the row indices
that have 1 in the l-th column of Hadamard matrix HK for l ∈ [K]. We divide the users into K sets
(US1, . . . ,USK), where each set contains n/K users. We assign a set Bi = Bl representing a subset of inputs
for each user i ∈ USl. Then, user i generates a virtual output Y 1i ∈ {0, 1} as follows
Y 1i =
{
1 if
(
Xi ∈ Bi and U1i = 0
)
or
(
X /∈ Bi and U1i = 1
)
,
0 otherwise.
(38)
Observe that the representation of Y 1i in (38) is exactly the same as in (30) by setting q = Pr
[
U1i = 0
]
= e

e+1 .
We represent Y 1i with this form to explicitly show the random keys used to design the Hadamard scheme
presented in Section 5.2. Let Y ji be the virtual output generated by user i for the jth analyst, which is given
by
Y ji = Y
1
i ⊕ U2i ⊕ . . .⊕ U ji , (39)
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR. Hence, we add randomization to the first step of the Hadamard scheme.
User i transmits the output Y di to all analysts. The private scheme is shown in Figure 8.
Lemma 5. The jth output of user i satisfies j-LDP, i.e.,
sup
yji∈{0,1}
sup
xi,x′i∈X
Pr
[
Y ji = y
j
i |Xi = xi
]
Pr
[
Y ji = y
j
i |Xi = x′i
] ≤ ej (40)
We prove Lemma 5 in Appendix E. Note that each analyst has access to the public outputs {Y d1 , . . . , Y dn }
which is d-LDP. Additionally, user i sends a random key L
j
i = U
d
i ⊕ . . .⊕U j+1i to the jth analyst. Using the
random keys {Lj1, . . . , Ljn}, the jth analyst can construct the private outputs {Y j1 , . . . , Y jn} which are j-LDP,
where Y ji = Y
d
i ⊕ Lji . Observe that the privatized output Y ji has a conditional distribution given by
Qi
(
Y ji |Xi
)
=
{
ej
ej+1
if Xi ∈ Bi
1
ej+1
if Xi 6∈ Bi (41)
18
which coincides with the private mechanism given in (30) with q = e
j
ej+1
. From Lemma 4, for privacy level
j = O (1), we get that
r
`22,j
,R,n,k = O
(
k
n2j
)
, (42)
for analyst j, which coincides with the lower bound stated in Corollary 1. Observe that the total amount of
randomness per user in the proposed mechanism is given by
Rproposedtotal =
d∑
j=1
H
(
U j
)
=
d∑
j=1
H2 (qj) ≤ Rtrivialtotal , (43)
where qj is defined in (37). Note that the last inequality is strict for d > 1, which follows from the argument
presented in Section 3.2. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
7 Private Recoverability (Proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5)
In this section, we prove Theorem 4 (see page 10) and Theorem 5 (see page 11).
7.1 Proof of Theorem 4
This section proves the necessary and sufficient conditions on the random key U and the privatized output
Y to design an -LDP-Rec mechanism. We first prove that |Y| ≥ |X | is necessary to recover X from Y and
U . We then prove that each input x ∈ X should be mapped with non-zero probability to every output y ∈ Y ;
hence, we get |U| ≥ |Y|, since each input x ∈ X can be mapped with non-zero probability to at most |U|
outputs. The main part of our proof is bounding the randomness of the key U in the second condition. We
first prove in Lemma 7 that for any -LDP-Rec mechanism designed using a random key of size greater than
the input size, there exists another -LDP-Rec mechanism designed using a random key of size equal to
the input size with the same or smaller amount of randomness. Thus, we can assume that |U| = |X | and
minimize the entropy of the random key U over all possible distributions and under the -LDP constraint.
Since entropy is a concave function of the distribution, we get a non-convex problem. However, we can obtain
an exact solution for the problem due to the structure of the privacy constraints that form a closed polytope.
For the sufficiency part, we prove in Lemma 6 that we can construct an -LDP-Rec mechanism using the
random key Us
∗
min defined in Theorem 4 that satisfies the two necessary conditions.
Before we proceed into the proof of Theorem 4, we first present the following two lemmas whose proofs
are given in Appendix F and Appendix G, respectively.
Lemma 6. For given a random key U ∈ U with size |U| = k having a distribution q = [q1, . . . , qk] such that
qmax
qmin
≤ e, where qmax = max
j∈[k]
qj and qmin = min
j∈[k]
qj , there exists an -LDP-Rec mechanism with input X ∈ [k]
and an output Y ∈ [k] designed using U .
This lemma shows that we can design an -LDP mechanism with output size equal to the input size if we
have a random key with size equal the input size and having a distribution such that qmaxqmin ≤ e.
Lemma 7. Suppose that an -LDP-Rec mechanism with an input X ∈ [k] and an output Y ∈ Y is designed
using a random key U ∈ U with size |U| = m > k. Then there exists an -LDP-Rec mechanism with an input
X ∈ [k] and an output Y ∈ [k] designed using a random key U ′ ∈ [k] such that H (U) ≥ H (U ′).
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4. We prove the first necessary condition of Theorem 4 in two parts:
We can show |Y| ≥ |X | using the recoverability constraint and |U| ≥ |Y| using the privacy constraint. We
prove these in Appendix H.
From Lemma 7 and the first necessary condition, we see that the -LDP-Rec mechanism with the smallest
amount of randomness is obtained when |U| = |Y| = |X | = k. Hence, we restrict our attention to this
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case only. Let U ∈ [k] be a random key having a distribution q = [q1, . . . , qk]. Without loss of generality,
we assume that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qk. Before we prove the necessity of the second condition, we claim that
qk/q1 ≤ e. We prove this using both privacy and recoverability constraints in Appendix H.
Now, we are ready to prove the necessity of the second condition. Our objective is to find the minimum
entropy of the random key U with size |U| = k such that the private mechanism is -LDP and the sample X
can be recovered from observing Y and the random key U . The problem can be formulated as follows
min
q=[q1,...,qk]
H (U) = −
k∑
j=1
qj log (qj) (44)
s.t., 1 ≤ qj
q1
≤ e ∀j ∈ [k] (45)
k∑
j=1
qj = 1, qj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [k] (46)
where the constraint (45) is obtained from the claim proved above. Observe that the constraints (45)-(46) form
a closed polytope. Furthermore, the objective function (44) is a concave function on q. Since we minimize a
concave function over a polytope, the global optimum point is one of the vertices of the polytope [Ros83].
Since we have a single equality constraint, a vertex has to satisfy at least k − 1 inequality constraints with
equality. Observe that none of the inequalities in (46) can be satisfied with equality, otherwise the privacy
constraints in (45) would be violated. Thus, the optimal vertex is of the form
q =
q1, . . . , q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−s terms
, eq1, . . . , e
q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s terms

such that s of inequalities from
qj
q1
≤ e are satisfied with equality and (k − s− 1) of inequalities from 1 ≤ qjq1
are satisfied with equality, where s is a variable to be optimized. Hence, the optimal distribution has the form
qs =
 1se + k − s , . . . , 1se + k − s︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−s terms
,
e
se + k − s , . . . ,
e
se + k − s︸ ︷︷ ︸
s terms
 , (47)
where s is an integer parameter chosen to minimize the entropy as follows
s∗ = arg min
s∈[k]
k∑
j=1
qsj log
(
1
qsj
)
= arg min
s∈[k]
log (s (e − 1) + k)− se

s (e − 1) + k
= arg min
s∈[k]
log (s (e − 1) + k) + e
k
(e − 1) (s (e − 1) + k) −
e
e − 1 .
(48)
In order to solve the optimization problem (48), we relax the problem by assuming s is a real number taking
values in [0, k]. The optimization problem in (48) is non-convex in for general values of  and k. Thus, we
get all local minima by setting the derivative to zero along with the boundary points s ∈ {0, k}. Then we
check all these critical points to obtain the global minimum point. However, we can see that at the boundary
points s ∈ {0, k}, the objective function is equal to log (k) which is the maximum entropy for any random
variable with support size k. Hence, the optimal solution is one of the local minimums. We can verify that
the objective function has only one local minimum point by setting the derivative with respect to s to zero.
Thus, we get
s˜ = k
e (− 1) + 1
(e − 1)2 , (49)
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where s˜ denotes the local minimum point. Since (48) is a continuous function in the real variable s, the
optimal discrete point s∗ is within the local minimum s˜. Hence, we get the closest integer to the real value
in (49). As a result, we get
H (U) ≥ H
(
Us
∗
min
)
,
where s∗ = arg min
s∈{dle,blc}
H (Usmin) for l = k
e(−1)+1
(e−1)2 , and U
s
min is a random variable having a distribution
qs
∗
given in (47). Hence, the proof of the necessary part is completed.
The sufficiency part is straightforward: Note that the random key Us
∗
min defined in Theorem 4 satisfies the
necessary conditions, and Lemma 6, we can construct an -LDP-Rec mechanism using the random key Us
∗
min.
Thus, these conditions are sufficient.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 5
In this section, we show that the Hadamard response (HR) scheme proposed in [ASZ19] is, in fact, an
-LDP-Rec mechanism, where it is possible to recover the input X from the output Y and randomness U .
Furthermore, we show that it is order optimal from a randomness perspective9.
We briefly describe the HR mechanism, and then analyze its performance. We refer to [ASZ19] for more
details. The HR mechanism is parameterized by two parameters: K denotes the support size of the private
mechanism output (Y = [K]), and s ≤ K is a positive integer. For each x ∈ X , let Cx ⊆ [K] be a subset of
outputs of size |Cx| = s. The private mechanism for HR is defined by
Q (y|X) =
{
e
se+K−s if y ∈ Cx
1
se+K−s if y /∈ Cx
(50)
We can easily show that this is a symmetric mechanism, i.e., it can be represented using a private key U of
size |K| that is independent of the mechanism input X. Furthermore the distribution of the private key U is
given by
qHR =
 1se +K − s , . . . , 1se +K − s︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−s terms
,
e
se +K − s , . . . ,
e
se +K − s︸ ︷︷ ︸
s terms

It remains to choose K, s, and {Cx}x∈X for fixed  and input size |X | = k. In [ASZ19, Section 5], the authors
proposed K = B × b and s = b/2, where B = 2dlog2(min{e,2k})e−1, and b = 2dlog2( kB+1)e. Furthermore, each
set Cx is a subset of rows indices of the Hadamard matrix. These parameters are chosen such that s is close
to max{ ke , 1}, and K is approximately the smallest power of 2 greater than k. The reason behind using
values that are powers of 2 is to exploit the structure of the Hadamard matrix. In [ASZ19, Theorem 7], the
authors proved that the minimax risk of HR for `22 loss function is given by
r
`22
,n,k ≤
 O
(
k
n2
)
for  < 1
O ( kne ) for 1 ≤  ≤ log (k)O ( 1n) for  > log (k) (51)
which is order optimal for all privacy levels. In addition, the authors in [AS19] have shown that the HR
scheme is order optimal for heavy hitter estimation in the high privacy regime ( = O (1)). In the following,
we analyze the performance of HR with respect to the randomness of the private mechanism. Observe that
for fixed  and k, the parameters K, B, and b of HR is bounded by
min{e, 2k}
2
≤ B ≤ min{e, 2k}, k
min{e, 2k} ≤ b ≤
4k
min{e, 2k} , k ≤ K ≤ 4k.
9We mention that the Hadamard mechanism in [ASZ19] is symmetric with non-binary outputs, while the Hadamard response
in [AS19] has only binary outputs.
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Hence, the entropy of the private key used to generate the HR private mechanism is bounded by
HHR (U) = log
(
b
2
e +K − b
2
)
− e
 b
2
b
2e
 +K − b2
≤ log
(
2k
min{e, 2k} (e
 − 1) + 4k
)
− e

e − 1 + 2 min{e, 2k}
=
{
log
(
2k 3e
−1
e
)− e3e−1 if  ≤ log (k) + 1,
log (e + 4k − 1)− ee+4k−1 if  > log (k) + 1.
(52)
The minimum entropy of the private key to generate an -LDP-Rec mechanism is bounded by (Theorem 4)
Hmin (U) = log (s∗e + k − s∗)− e
s∗
s∗e + k − s∗
≥
 log
(
k
(
e
e−1
))
− e
e+
(e−1)2
e(−1)+1−1
if  ≤ log (k) ,
log (e + k − 1)− ee+k−1 if  > log (k) .
(53)
From (52) and (53), we can verify that HR is randomness-order-optimal for all privacy levels .
8 Sequence of Distribution Estimation (Proof of Theorem 6)
In this section, we prove Theorem 6 (see page 11). The main idea of our proof is as follows. The first condition
is obtained in a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem 4. For the second condition, we relate the minimum
amount of randomness required to preserve privacy of T samples to the minimum amount of randomness
required to preserve privacy of T −1 samples. In particular, we prove that H (U) ≥ H (Umin,T−1)+H (Umin,1),
where H (Umin,t) is the minimum amount of randomness of a key when we have a database of t input samples.
Definition 2. Let U ∈ U be a random key drawn from a discrete distribution q = [q1, · · · , qkT ] with a
support size |U| = kT , where qu = Pr [U = u]. We say that the distribution q satisfies -DP, if there exists a
bijective function f : X T → [1 : kT ] from the dataset X T to integers [1 : kT ], such that for every neighboring
databases x,x′ ∈ [k]T , we have
qf(x)
qf(x′)
≤ e. (54)
We begin our proof with the following lemma which is a generalized version of Lemma 6. We prove it in
Appendix I.
Lemma 8. Consider an input database x =
(
x(1), . . . , x(T )
) ∈ [k]T , and a random key U ∈ U =
{u1, · · · , ukT } distributed according to an -DP distribution q = [q1, · · · , qkT ]. Then, there exists an -
DP-Rec mechanism Q : [k]
T → [k]T that uses U to create an output Y T ∈ [k]T , such that we can recover the
input database XT from (U, Y T ).
We can prove the first necessary condition of Theorem 6 (which is to show |U| ≥ |YT | ≥ |X T |) in the same
way as we proved that for Theorem 4. For completeness, we provide a proof of it in Appendix I. Now we prove
the necessity of the second condition. Consider an arbitrary -DP-Rec mechanism Q with output Y T ∈ YT
using a random key U ∈ U , where |YT | = m ≥ kT and |U| = l ≥ m. Let U ∼ q, where q = [q1, . . . , ql] such
that qu = Pr [U = u] for u ∈ U . Let Uyx ⊂ U be a subset of key values such that the input XT = x is mapped
to Y T = y when U ∈ Uyx. Thus, the private mechanism Q can be represented as
Q (y|x) =
∑
u∈Uyx
qu. (55)
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Observe that
∑
y∈YT Q (y|x) = 1, since Q (y|x) is a conditional distribution for any given x ∈ [k]T . Since Q is
an -DP-Rec mechanism, it follows from the recoverability constraint that each input x is mapped to y using
a different set of key values (Uyx
⋂Uyx′ = φ). Thus, for each y ∈ YT , we have sy = ∑x∈[k]T Q (y|x) ≤ 1.
Furthermore, we get
∑
y∈YT
∑
x∈[k]T Q (y|x) =
∑
y∈YT sy = k
T .
We sort the kT databases in X T in lexicographic order by arranging them in increasing order of x(1). Then,
we arrange the databases that have the same x(1) in increasing order of x(2) and so on. For example, database
x =
(
x(1), . . . , x(i), x(i+1), . . . , x(T )
)
will appear before the database x˜ =
(
x(1), . . . , x(i), x˜(i+1), . . . , x˜(T )
)
when
x(i+1) < x˜(i+1). Furthermore, we denote xi as the ith database in the lexicographic order for i ∈ [k]T .
Observe that sy =
∑
x∈[k]T Q (y|x) for given y ∈ YT . Thus, the probabilities Py =
[
Py1 , . . . , P
y
kT
]
construct a
valid distribution with support size kT , where Pyj =
Q(y|xj)
sy
for j ∈ [k]T . Furthermore, for every neighboring
databases x,x′ ∈ [k]T , we have
Q(y|x)/sy
Q(y|x′)/sy
=
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x′)
(a)
≤ e, (56)
where step (a) follows from the fact that Q is an -DP-Rec mechanism. Hence, the distribution Py is -DP
distribution. The proof of the following lemma is presented in Appendix J.
Lemma 9. For every output y ∈ YT , we have H (Py) ≥ H (Umin,T−1) + H (Umin,1) , where H (Umin,t)
denotes the minimum randomness of a private key when we have a database of t samples for t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Using Lemma 9, we can prove Theorem 6 as follows.
H (U) =
1
kT
∑
x∈[k]T
H (U)
(a)
≥ 1
kT
∑
x∈[k]T
H
(
Y T |XT = x)
=
1
kT
∑
x∈[k]T
∑
y∈YT
−Q (y|x) log (Q (y|x))
=
1
kT
∑
y∈YT
sy
 ∑
x∈[k]T
−Q (y|x)
sy
log
(
Q (y|x)
sy
)− sy log (sy)

=
1
kT
∑
y∈YT
[
syH (P
y)− sy log (sy)
]
(b)
≥ 1
kT
∑
y∈YT
[
sy (H (Umin,T−1) +H (Umin,1))− sy log (sy)
]
(c)
≥ H (Umin,T−1) +H (Umin,1) , (57)
where step (a) follows from the fact that Q (y|x) is a function of U . Step (b) follows from Lemma 9. The
inequality (c) follows from solving the problem
min
{sy}
∑
y∈YT
sy [H (Umin,T−1) +H (Umin,1)]− sy log (sy)
s.t.
∑
y∈YT
sy = k
T and 0 ≤ sy ≤ 1, ∀ y ∈ YT
(58)
Note that f (x) = −x log (x) is a concave function on 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Therefore, the objective function in (58) is
concave in {sy}. The minimum value of a concave function is one of the vertices which is obtained when
all the inequalities are satisfied by equalities. By setting kT of the sy’s to be one and setting the remaining
|YT | − kT of sy’s to be zero, the objective value in (58) becomes kT , which gives inequality (c).
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Now, from (57), we conclude that H (U) ≥ TH (Umin,1), where H (Umin,1) is the minimum amount of
randomness required to design an -LDP-Rec mechanism given in Theorem 4. This completes the proof of
Theorem 6.
References
[ACFT18] Jayadev Acharya, Cle´ment L Canonne, Cody Freitag, and Himanshu Tyagi. Test without trust:
Optimal locally private distribution testing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.02174, 2018.
[App17] Apple. Differential privavy. 2017.
[AS19] Jayadev Acharya and Ziteng Sun. Communication complexity in locally private distribution
estimation and heavy hitters. In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), pages
51–60, 2019.
[ASZ19] Jayadev Acharya, Ziteng Sun, and Huanyu Zhang. Hadamard response: Estimating distributions
privately, efficiently, and with little communication. In International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS), pages 1120–1129, 2019.
[BBGG19] Borja Balle, Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, and Joseph Geumlek. Privacy amplification by
mixing and diffusion mechanisms. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
13277–13287, 2019.
[BHO19] Leighton Pate Barnes, Yanjun Han, and Ayfer Ozgur. Learning distributions from their samples
under communication constraints. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.02890, 2019.
[BNS18] Mark Bun, Jelani Nelson, and Uri Stemmer. Heavy hitters and the structure of local privacy. In
ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, pages 435–447,
2018.
[BNST17] Raef Bassily, Kobbi Nissim, Uri Stemmer, and Abhradeep Guha Thakurta. Practical locally
private heavy hitters. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2288–2296,
2017.
[BS15] Raef Bassily and Adam Smith. Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct histograms. In
STOC, pages 127–135, 2015.
[DJW18] John C Duchi, Michael I Jordan, and Martin J Wainwright. Minimax optimal procedures for
locally private estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 113(521):182–201,
2018.
[DLMV12] Yevgeniy Dodis, Adriana Lo´pez-Alt, Ilya Mironov, and Salil P. Vadhan. Differential privacy
with imperfect randomness. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors, Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO, volume 7417, pages 497–516. Springer, 2012.
[DMNS06] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity
in private data analysis. In Theory of cryptography conference, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
[DR14] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Foundations
and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3-4):211–407, 2014.
[DR19] John Duchi and Ryan Rogers. Lower bounds for locally private estimation via communication
complexity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.00582, 2019.
[DWJ13] John Duchi, Martin J Wainwright, and Michael I Jordan. Local privacy and minimax bounds:
Sharp rates for probability estimation. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 1529–1537, 2013.
24
[Dwo19] Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy and the us census. In ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI
Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, pages 1–1, 2019.
[EPK14] U´lfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. RAPPOR: randomized aggregatable
privacy-preserving ordinal response. In ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security, pages 1054–1067, 2014.
[HKR12] Justin Hsu, Sanjeev Khanna, and Aaron Roth. Distributed private heavy hitters. In International
Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, pages 461–472. Springer, 2012.
[KBR16] Peter Kairouz, Keith Bonawitz, and Daniel Ramage. Discrete distribution estimation under
local privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.07387, 2016.
[KOV14] Peter Kairouz, Sewoong Oh, and Pramod Viswanath. Extremal mechanisms for local differential
privacy. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 2879–2887, 2014.
[QYY+16] Zhan Qin, Yin Yang, Ting Yu, Issa Khalil, Xiaokui Xiao, and Kui Ren. Heavy hitter estimation
over set-valued data with local differential privacy. In CCS, pages 192–203. ACM, 2016.
[Ros83] J Ben Rosen. Global minimization of a linearly constrained concave function by partition of
feasible domain. Mathematics of Operations Research, 8(2):215–230, 1983.
[SC13] Anand D. Sarwate and Kamalika Chaudhuri. Signal processing and machine learning with
differential privacy: Algorithms and challenges for continuous data. IEEE Signal Process. Mag.,
30(5):86–94, 2013.
[Sha49] Claude E Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell system technical journal,
28(4):656–715, 1949.
[Tsy08] Alexandre B Tsybakov. Introduction to nonparametric estimation. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2008.
[War65] Stanley L Warner. Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive answer
bias. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 60(309):63–69, 1965.
[WHW+16] Shaowei Wang, Liusheng Huang, Pengzhan Wang, Yiwen Nie, Hongli Xu, Wei Yang, Xiang-
Yang Li, and Chunming Qiao. Mutual information optimally local private discrete distribution
estimation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.08025, 2016.
[YB18] M. Ye and A. Barg. Optimal schemes for discrete distribution estimation under locally differential
privacy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 64(8):5662–5676, Aug 2018.
[Zam98] Ram Zamir. A proof of the fisher information inequality via a data processing argument. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 44(3):1246–1250, 1998.
25
A Lower Bound on The Minimax Risk Estimation Using Fisher
Information
In this section, we introduce an alternative proof of Theorem 1. Our proof is inspired by the approach
in [BHO19] that uses Fisher information to bound the minimax risk estimation under communication
constraints. The main idea of our proof is to formulate a non-convex optimization problem to bound the
Fisher information matrix under privacy and randomness constraints. Let P ⊂ ∆k be a subset of simplex ∆k
defined by
P =
p ∈ Rk :
k∑
j=1
pj = 1,
1
k
≤ pj ≤ 2
k
, pj+k/2 =
2
k
− pj , ∀j ∈ [k/2]
 .
For every p ∈ P, the number of free variables is k/2, where each parameter pj+k/2 is associated with the
variable pj , ∀ j ∈ [k/2]. For a given distribution p ∈ ∆k, we define the marginal distribution on the output
Y as
M (y|p) =
k∑
j=1
Q (Y = y|X = j) pj . (59)
Let Sp (y) denote the k/2-vector score function of Y given by
Sp (y) =
[
Sp1 (y) , . . . , Spk/2 (y)
]
=
[
∂ log (M (y|p))
∂p1
, . . . ,
∂ log (M (y|p))
∂pk/2
]
.
(60)
Then, the Fisher information matrix for estimating p ∈ P from Y is given by
IY (p) = E
[
Sp (y)Sp (y)
T
]
, (61)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the output Y . Now, consider the following inequalities
r
`22
,R,n,k = inf{Qi∈Q(,R)}
inf
pˆ
sup
p∈∆k
E
[
`22 (pˆ (Y
n) ,p)
]
≥ inf
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
inf
pˆ
sup
p∈P
E
[
`22 (pˆ (Y
n) ,p)
]
(a)
≥ (k/2)
2
sup
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
sup
p∈P
Tr (IY n (p)) +
k
2pi
2
(62)
where IY n (p) denotes the Fisher information matrix for estimating p from Y
n = [Y1, . . . , Yn], and Tr (IY n (p))
denotes the trace of the Fisher information matrix IY n (p). Step (a) follows from the van Trees inequal-
ity [BHO19][Eqn.4-8]. Our goal is to bound the term sup{Qi∈Q(,R)} supp∈P Tr (IY n (p)). For a given
distribution p ∈ P, the random variables Y1, . . . , Yn are independent. As a result, the trace of the Fisher
information matrix for estimating p from Y1, . . . , Yn is bounded by
sup
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
sup
p∈P
Tr (IY n (p))
(a)
= sup
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
sup
p∈P
n∑
i=1
Tr (IYi (p))
≤ sup
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
sup
p∈P
n sup
i∈[n]
Tr (IYi (p))
(b)
≤
 2nk
e(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2nk
p2R(e
−1)2
e if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
(63)
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where step (a) follows from the chain rule of the Fisher information [Zam98][Lemma 1]. Step (b) follows from
Lemma 10 presented below. Substituting from (63) into (62), we get
r
`22
,R,n,k ≥

k(e+1)2
16ne(e−1)2 if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
ke
16np2R(e
−1)2 if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (64)
for n ≥ 4 e
p2R(e
−1)2 .
Lemma 10. For any (, R)-LDP mechanism, the trace of the Fisher information matrix IY (p) is bounded
by
sup
Q∈Q(,R)
sup
p∈P
Tr (IY (p)) ≤
 2k
e(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2k
p2R(e
−1)2
e if R < H2
(
e
e+1
) (65)
where H2
(
e
e+1
)
is the Shannon entropy, and pR < 0.5 denotes the inverse Shannon entropy pR = h
−1 (R).
Proof. For a given distribution p ∈ P, we have
Spj (y) =
∂ log (M (y|p))
∂pj
=
Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2)
M (y|p) ,
(66)
for j ∈ [k/2]. By taking the expectation with respect to Y , we get
E
[
Spj (Y )
2
]
=
∑
y∈Y
(Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2))2∑k
j′=1Q (y|j′) pj′
(67)
Thus, the trace of the Fisher information matrix is given by
Tr (IY (p)) =
k/2∑
j=1
E
[
Spj (Y )
2
]
=
k/2∑
j=1
∑
y∈Y
(Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2))2∑k
j′=1Q (y|j′) pj′
≤ k
2
max
j∈[k/2]
∑
y∈Y
(Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2))2∑k
j′=1Q (y|j′) pj′
(a)
≤ ke max
j∈[k/2]
∑
y∈Y
(Q (y|j)−Q (y|j + k/2))2
Q (y|j) +Q (y|j + k/2)
(b)
≤
 2k
e(e−1)2
(e+1)2
if R ≥ H2
(
e
e+1
)
2k
p2R(e
−1)2
e if R < H2
(
e
e+1
)
(68)
where step (a) follows from the fact that Q (y|j′) ≥ e−Q (y|j) and Q (y|j′) ≥ e−Q (y|j + k/2) , ∀j′ ∈ [k].
Thus, we have
k∑
j′=1
Q (y|j′) pj′ ≥ e−Q (y|j) +Qi (y|j + k/2)
2
k∑
j′=1
pj′
= e−
Q (y|j) +Q (y|j + k/2)
2
(69)
Step (b) follows from Lemma 2 presented at the end of Section 5.1. This completes the proof of Lemma 10. 
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B Proof of Lemma 1
We start our proof by Assoud’s method.
Lemma 11. (Assouad’s Method [DJW18]) For the family of distributions
{
pν : ν ∈ V = {−1, 1}k/2}, and
a loss function ` (pˆ,p) =
∑k
j=1 φ (pˆj − pj) defined in Section 5.1, we have
r`,R,n,k (Q
n) = inf
pˆ
sup
p∈∆k
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,p)]
≥ φ (δ)
k/2∑
j=1
(
1− ||Mn+j −Mn−j ||TV
) (70)
For completeness, we present the proof of Lemma 11 in Appendix D. Let {ej}k/2j=1 be the standard basis of
Rk/2. Consider now the following inequalities:
k/2∑
j=1
(
1− ∥∥Mn+j −Mn−j∥∥TV) (a)≥ k/2∑
j=1
1− 1|V| ∑
ν:νj=1
||
(
n∏
i=1
Mνi
)
−
(
n∏
i=1
M
ν−2ej
i
)
||TV

≥
k/2∑
j=1
(
1− sup
ν:νj=1
||
(
n∏
i=1
Mνi
)
−
(
n∏
i=1
M
ν−2ej
i
)
||TV
)
(b)
≥
k/2∑
j=1
1− sup
ν:νj=1
√√√√1
2
DKL
((
n∏
i=1
Mνi
)
||
(
n∏
i=1
M
ν−2ej
i
))
(c)
≥
k/2∑
j=1
1−
√√√√1
2
sup
ν:νj=1
n∑
i=1
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
=
k
2
1− 2
k
k/2∑
j=1
√√√√1
2
sup
ν:νj=1
n∑
i=1
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
(d)
≥ k
2
1−
√√√√1
k
k/2∑
j=1
sup
ν:νj=1
n∑
i=1
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
≥ k
2
(
1−
√
n
2
sup
j∈[k/2]
sup
i∈[n]
sup
ν:νj=1
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
))
(71)
where step (a) follows from the triangular inequality. Step (b) follows from Pinsker’s inequality that states
that for any two distributions P and Q, we get ‖P−Q‖TV ≤
√
1
2D (P||Q) [Tsy08, Lemma 2.5]. Step (c)
follows from the properties of KL-divergence. Step (d) follows from the concavity of function
√
x. Substituting
from (71) into (70), we get
r`,R,n,k = inf{Qi∈Q(,R)}
r`,R,n,k (Q
n)
≥ inf
{Qi∈Q(,R)}
φ (δ)
k
2
(
1−
√
n
2
sup
j∈[k/2]
sup
i∈[n]
sup
ν:νj=1
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
))
= φ (δ)
k
2
1−√n
2
sup
j∈[k/2]
sup
i∈[n]
sup
ν:νj=1
sup
Qi∈Q(,R)
DKL
(
Mνi ||Mν−2eji
)
(72)
Hence the proof is completed.
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C Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 12. The optimal solution of the non-convex optimization problem P1 is obtained when the the
output size is m = 2.
Proof. Note that if m = 1, then the optimal value of P1 will be zero, and hence, we have m ≥ 2. In the
following, we prove that the optimal solution is achievable at m = 2. Let
f
(
qmj ,q
m
j+k/2
)
=
m∑
l=1
(
ql,j − ql,j+k/2
)2
ql,j + ql,j+k/2
denote the objective function of the problem P1, where qmj = [q1,j , . . . , qm,j ] and q
m
j+k/2 =
[
q1,j+k/2, . . . , qm,j+k/2
]
.
Suppose that the optimal solution is obtained at m > 2. In other words, there exist two distributions
qmj and q
m
j+k/2 with size m > 2 that maximize the objective function f
(
qmj ,q
m
j+k/2
)
and satisfy the
constraints (24)-(??). We prove that if qmj and q
m
j+k/2 are optimal, then there exist two distributions
q˜m−1j and q˜
m−1
j+k/2 with support size m − 1 that satisfy the problem constraints and achieve at least
the same objective value as qmj and q
m
j+k/2. Let q˜
m−1
j = [q1,j , . . . , qm−2,j , qm−1,j + qm,j ] and q˜
m−1
j+k/2 =[
q1,j+k/2, . . . , qm−2,j+k/2, qm−1,j + qm,j+k/2
]
. We can easily verify that H
(
q˜m−1j
) ≤ R as H (qmj ) ≤ R and
H
(
q˜m−1j+k/2
)
≤ R as H
(
qmj+k/2
)
≤ R. Furthermore, we have
e− = e−
qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
≤ qm−1,j + qm,j
qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
≤ e qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
= e (73)
Hence, the distributions q˜m−1j and q˜
m−1
j+k/2 satisfy the constraints of the problem P1. Consider the following
inequalities
f
(
q˜mj , q˜
m−1
j+k/2
)
− f
(
qmj ,q
m
j+k/2
)
=
(
qm−1,j + qm,j − qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
)2
qm−1,j + qm,j + qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
−
[(
qm−1,j − qm−1,j+k/2
)2
qm−1,j + qm−1,j+k/2
+
(
qm,j − qm,j+k/2
)2
qm,j + qm,j+k/2
]
(a)
≥
(
qm−1,j + qm,j − qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
)2
qm−1,j + qm,j + qm−1,j+k/2 + qm,j+k/2
− 2
(
qm−1,j+qm,j
2 −
qm−1,j+k/2+qm,j+k/2
2
)2
qm−1,j+qm,j
2 +
qm−1,j+k/2+qm,j+k/2
2
= 0
(74)
where step (a) follows from the convexity of the function (x− y)2 / (x+ y) for x, y ∈ [0 : 1]. Hence the
distributions q˜mj , q˜
m−1
j+k/2 have at least the same objective value as q
m
j and q
m
j+k/2. 
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D Proof of Lemma 11
Consider an arbitrary estimator pˆ, then we have
sup
p∈∆k
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,p)] ≥ sup
ν∈V
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,pν)]
≥ 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
E [` (pˆ (Y n) ,pν)]
≥ φ (δ) 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
E
k/2∑
j=1
1 (ψj (Y
n) 6= νj)

≥ φ (δ)
k/2∑
j=1
 1
|V|
∑
ν∈V:νj=+1
E [1 (ψj (Y n) 6= +1)] + 1|V|
∑
ν∈V:νj=−1
E [1 (ψj (Y n) 6= −1)]

≥ φ (δ)
k/2∑
j=1
inf
ψ
 1
|V|
∑
ν∈V:νj=+1
Pr [ψj (Y
n) 6= +1] + 1|V|
∑
ν∈V:νj=−1
Pr [ψj (Y
n) 6= −1]

= φ (δ)
k/2∑
j=1
1
2
inf
ψ
(
Mn+j [ψj (Y
n) 6= +1] + Mn+j [ψj (Yn) 6= −1]
)
≥ φ (δ)
k/2∑
j=1
(
1− ||Mn+j −Mn−j ||TV
)
(75)
where ψ =
(
ψ1, . . . , ψk/2
)
is a vector of test functions.
E Proof of Lemma 5
We claim that the conditional distribution on Y ji |Xi is given by
Pr
[
Y ji = 1|Xi
]
=
{
ej
ej+1
if Xi ∈ Bi
1
ej+1
if Xi /∈ Bi (76)
which is j-LDP. We prove our claim by induction. For the basis step, we can easily verify that Y
1
i defined
in (38) follows the conditional distribution in (76). For the induction step, suppose that our claim is true for
j. Observe that Y j+1i = Y
j
i ⊕ U j+1i . Hence, we have
Pr
[
Y j+1i = 1|Xi ∈ Bi
]
= Pr
[
Y j+1i = 1|Xi ∈ Bi, Y ji = 1
]
Pr
[
Y ji = 1|Xi ∈ Bi
]
+ Pr
[
Y j+1i = 1|Xi ∈ Bi, Y ji = 0
]
Pr
[
Y ji = 0|Xi ∈ Bi
]
= Pr
[
U j+1i = 0
]
Pr
[
Y ji = 1|Xi ∈ Bi
]
+ Pr
[
U j+1i = 1
]
Pr
[
Y ji = 0|Xi ∈ Bi
]
= (1− qj+1) (1− zj) + qj+1zj
= 1− zj+1 = e
j+1
ej+1 + 1
(77)
Similarly, we can prove that Pr
[
Y j+1i = 1|Xi /∈ Bi
]
= zj+1 =
1
ej+1+1
. Hence, the proof is completed.
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F Proof of Lemma 6
In order to recover X from Y and U , it is required that each input database x ∈ [k] is mapped to y with
a different value of key U for every output y ∈ [k]. Let y = x ⊕ u for all x ∈ [k] and u ∈ [k], where
x ⊕ y = [(x+ u− 2) mod k] + 1. Note that the set [k] along with the operation ⊕ forms a group10. The
private mechanism Q is defined as follows
Q (y|x) = qu, (78)
for y = x ⊕ u. Note that an input x is mapped to each output y with a different value of the key
U = (k − x+ 2)⊕ y. Moreover, for a given output y, we can easily see that each input x ∈ [k] is mapped to
y with a different value of the key U . Hence, it is possible to recover X from Y and U . Furthermore, for any
two inputs x, x′ ∈ X , we have
sup
y∈[k]
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x′) ≤
qmax
qmin
(a)
≤ e, (79)
where qmax = max
j∈[k]
qj and qmin = min
j∈[k]
qj . Step (a) follows from the assumption that
qmax
qmin
≤ e. Thus, the
mechanism Q is an -LDP-Rec mechanism.
G Proof of Lemma 7
Before we present the proof of Lemma 7, we provide the following lemma whose proof is in Appendix K.
Lemma 13. Let U ∈ U = {u1, . . . , um} be a random variable with size m having a distribution q =
[q1, . . . , qm], where q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qm. Then, the random variable U ′ ∈ U ′ = {u1, . . . , um−1} with distribution
q′ =
[
q′1, . . . , q
′
m−1
]
has an entropy
H (U) ≥ H (U ′) , (80)
where q′j = qj/ (1− qm) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
This lemma shows that if we trim the last symbol that has the lowest probability from a distribution, and
normalize the remaining probabilities, then we get a distribution that has lower entropy.
The main idea of the proof of Lemma 7 is that we do some reduction steps to get a new random key U ′
with a support size equal to the input size from the random key U . In addition, this new random key U ′ has
lower entropy than the entropy of the original random key U . First, we give an example to illustrate the idea,
and then we proceed to the general proof.
Example 1. Suppose that a random key U ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6} has a distribution q = [q1, . . . , q6], where
q1 ≥ · · · ≥ q6. The random key U is used to design an -LDP-Rec mechanism Q with input X ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Suppose that there exists an output y such that X = x is mapped to y when U ∈ Uyx, where Uy1 = {6},
Uy2 = {2, 3}, and Uy3 = {1}. Hence, Q (y|X = 1) = q6, Q (y|X = 2) = q2 + q3, and Q (y|X = 3) = q1. Let
Uy =
⋃
x∈[3] Uyx = {1, 2, 3, 6}, and Uy = U \ Uy = {4, 5}. Let q˜ = [q6, q2 + q3, q1, q4, q5], where the first
three elements are Q (y|X = i) for i ∈ [3] and the remaining elements represent qu for u ∈ Uy. Then, we
sort the distribution q˜ in a descending order to get q˜↓ = [q2 + q3, q1, q4, q5, q6], where q˜
↓
i denotes the ith
largest component in q˜. Consider a random key U˜ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} having a distribution q˜↓. Observe that
H
(
U˜
)
≤ H (U), since U˜ can be represented as a function of U . Furthermore, we have q2+q3q1 ≤
q2+q3
q4
≤
q2+q3
q6
≤ e, since Q is an -LDP mechanism, and q4 ≥ q6. Consider a random key U ′ having a distribution
q′ =
[
q2+q3
1−(q5+q6) ,
q1
1−(q5+q6) ,
q4
1−(q5+q6)
]
obtained by trimming sequentially the last two symbols of the random
key U˜ . By applying Lemma 13 twice on the distribution q˜↓, we get that H (U) ≥ H
(
U˜
)
≥ H (U ′).
Furthermore, we have q′max/q
′
min ≤ e. Thus, from Lemma 6, we can construct an -LDP-Rec mechanism
with input X ∈ [3] and an output Y ∈ [3] using the random key U ′, where H (U) ≥ H (U ′).
10It is exactly the group defined on integers {0, . . . , k − 1} with modulo-k operation, but we subtract −2 before taking modk
and adding one to fit modulo-k operation with the set [k] = {1, . . . , k}
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We now present the general proof. Let U ∈ U = {u1, . . . , um} be a random key with size m > k having a
distribution q = [q1, . . . , qm]. Without loss of generality, assume that q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qm. Let Q be an -LDP-Rec
mechanism designed using a random key U with input X ∈ [k] and an output Y ∈ Y. Let Uyx ⊂ U be a
subset of keys such that the input X = x is mapped to Y = y when U ∈ Uyx for all x ∈ [k] and y ∈ Y. As a
result the private mechanism Q can be represented by Q (y|X = x) = ∑u∈Uyx qu.
Observe that for given y, we have Uyx
⋂Uyx′ = φ, otherwise we cannot recover X from Y and U , since
there would be x and x′ mapped to y with the same key value. Let Uy =
⋃
x∈[k] Uyx, and hence, Uy ⊆ U .
Furthermore, for given y, we have Q (y|X = x) /Q (y|X = x′) ≤ e, since Q is an -LDP mechanism.
Consider an output y ∈ Y such that u1 ∈ Uy. Let Uy = U \ Uy be an indexed set with size l = |Uy|,
where Uy (j) denotes the jth element in Uy. Consider a distribution q˜ = [q˜1, . . . , q˜l+k] designed as follows
q˜j = Q (y|X = j) for all j ∈ [k] and q˜j = qUy(j−k) for all i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + l}. We can sort the distribution
q˜ in a descending order to get q˜↓ =
[
q˜↓1 , . . . , q˜
↓
l+k
]
, where q˜↓i denotes the ith largest component in q˜. Let U˜
be a random key drawn from a distribution q˜↓. We have the following two properties on the distribution q˜↓:
1. H (U) ≥ H
(
U˜
)
.
2.
q˜↓1
q˜↓k
≤ e.
The first property is straightforward, since the random key U˜ can be represented as a function of U . Observe
that u1 ∈ Uy, and q1 ≥ qu for all u ∈ Uy. Hence, q˜↓1 is one of the first k elements in q˜. Thus, we get
q˜↓1
q˜↓k
(a)
≤ q˜max
q˜min
≤ e
where q˜max = maxj∈[k] q˜j = q˜
↓
1 and q˜min = minj∈[k] q˜j . If qu for u ∈ Uy is one of the first k elements in q˜↓,
i.e, qu > q˜min, then inequality (a) is still valid.
Now, let U ′ ∈ [k] be a random key drawn from a distribution q′ = [q′1, . . . , q′k], where q′j =
q˜↓j∑k
j=1 q˜
↓
j
.
Observe that q′ is obtained by applying Lemma 13 l times on q˜↓ to trim sequentially the last l symbols
of U˜ that have the lowest l probabilities. Thus, we get that H (U) ≥ H
(
U˜
)
≥ H (U ′). Furthermore, from
the second property, we have q′max/q
′
min =
q˜↓1
q˜↓k
≤ e. Thus, from Lemma 6, we can construct an -LDP-Rec
mechanism with input X ∈ [k] and an output Y ∈ [k] using the random key U ′, and H (U) ≥ H (U ′). This
completes the proof.
H Omitted Details from Section 7.1
First we prove the first necessary condition of Theorem 4. As mentioned in Section 7.1, we prove this in
two parts: First we show |Y| ≥ |X | using the recoverability constraint and then |U| ≥ |Y| using the privacy
constraint.
|Y| ≥ |X |: Observe that the output Y of the private mechanism Q can be represented as a function of the
input X and the random key U , i.e., Y = f (X,U). Fix the value of the random key U = u for an arbitrary
u ∈ U . Then, for each value of x ∈ X , the function f (X,U) should generate a different output Y in order
to be able to recover X from Y and U . In other words, each input x ∈ X should be mapped to a different
output y ∈ Y for the same value of the random key u ∈ U . Otherwise, there exists two inputs mapped with
the same key value to the same output. As a result, it is required that the output size is at least the same as
the input size: |Y| ≥ |X |.
|U| ≥ |Y|: Let Y (x) ⊆ Y be a subset of outputs such that input X = x is mapped with non-zero
probability to every y ∈ Y (x). We claim that Y (x) = Y for all x ∈ X for any -LDP-Rec mechanism. In
other words, we claim that each input x ∈ X should be mapped with non-zero probability to every output
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y ∈ Y. We prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exist x, x′ ∈ X such that Y (x) 6= Y (x′).
Thus, there exists y ∈ Y (x) \ Y (x′) or y ∈ Y (x′) \ Y (x). Hence, we have Q(y|x)Q(y|x′) → ∞ or
Q(y|x′)
Q(y|x) → ∞
which violates the privacy constraints. Therefore, Y (x) = Y (x′) = Y for all x, x′ ∈ X . However, for a given
x ∈ X , we have |Y (x) | ≤ |U|, since each input x ∈ X can be mapped with non-zero probability to at most
|U| outputs. Thus, we get that the random key size is at least the same as the output size: |U| ≥ |Y| ≥ |X |.
Hence, the first condition is necessary to design an -LDP-Rec mechanism. This completes the proof of
the first necessary condition of Theorem 4.
Now, assuming q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qk, we show qk/q1 ≤ e. This will be required to prove the second
necessary condition to prove Theorem 4.
qk/q1 ≤ e: We prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose that qk/q1 > e. Consider a certain output
y ∈ Y such that there exists x ∈ X mapped to y when U = uk with probability qk. Note that each sample
x ∈ X should be mapped using a different value of the key to each output y ∈ Y in order to be able to recover
the sample X from Y and U . In our case, there are k − 1 remaining inputs to be mapped to y with different
values of keys; however, none of these k − 1 inputs can be mapped to y with U = u1, since qk/q1 > e, which
violates the privacy constraint. Hence, we have k − 1 inputs mapped to y using at most k − 2 values of keys.
Thus, there would exist at least two inputs mapped to output y with the same key value. Therefore, we
cannot recover X from y given U . As a result, we should have qk/q1 ≤ e.
I Proof of Lemma 8
To simplify the proof, we assume that [k] = {0, . . . , k − 1}. Let X T = [k]T denote the input dataset, and
Y T =
(
Y (1), . . . , Y (T )
)
be the output of the private mechanism Q that takes a value from a set YT = [k]T .
In order to recover XT from Y T and U , it is required that each input database x ∈ X T is mapped to each
output y ∈ [k]T with a different value of key U . Let the random key U be drawn from an -DP distribution
q. Hence, there exists a bijective function f : X T → [k]T such that
qf(x)
qf(x′)
≤ e. (81)
for every neighboring databases x,x′ ∈ [k]T . Let Q be a private mechanism defined as follows
Q (y|x) = qf(x⊕y). (82)
where x⊕ y = (x(1) ⊕ y(1), . . . , x(T ) ⊕ y(T ))11, and x(j) ⊕ y(j) = [(x(j) + y(j)) mod k] which is an addition
between x(j) and y(j) in a finite group of order k. For a fixed y ∈ YT , we can easily see that f (x⊕ y) 6=
f (xˆ⊕ y) for any x 6= xˆ and x, xˆ ∈ [k]T , since x⊕ y 6= xˆ⊕ y and f is a bijection. Hence, for every output
y ∈ [k]T , each input database x ∈ X T is mapped to an output y with a different value of key U . Thus, we
can recover XT from Y T and U . For a fixed x ∈ [k]T , we can see that f (x⊕ y) 6= f (x⊕ yˆ) for any y 6= yˆ
and y, yˆ ∈ [k]T , since x⊕ y 6= x⊕ yˆ and f is a bijection. Hence Q (y|x) is a valid conditional distribution
for each x ∈ [k]T . It remains to prove that the private mechanism Q given in (82) is -DP. In the following,
we prove that for every output y, and every neighboring databases x, x˜ ∈ [k]T , we have
Q (y|x)
Q (y|x˜) ≤ e
 (83)
Therefore, the private mechanism Q is -DP. The proof is by induction. For the basis step, observe that each
input database x is mapped to y0 = [0, . . . , 0] with probability qf(x) for x ∈ [k]T . Thus, for every neighboring
databases x, x˜ ∈ [k]T , we get
Q (y0|x)
Q (y0|x˜) =
qf(x)
qf(x˜)
(a)
≤ e (84)
11We apply elementwise operation ⊕ on the vectors x and y.
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where step (a) follows from the assumption that the distribution q satisfies -DP. For the induction step,
suppose there exists an output y ∈ [k]T that satisfies (83). Let y˜ be a neighboring output to y, i.e., y˜ and y
are different in only one element. Without loss of generality, let y(i) 6= y˜(i) while y(j) = y˜(j) for j 6= i. Then,
for every neighboring databases x, x˜ ∈ [k]T , we get
Q (y˜|x)
Q (y˜|x˜) =
qf(x⊕y˜)
qf(x˜⊕y˜)
=
qf(x⊕y)
qf(x˜⊕y)
(a)
≤ e
(85)
where x =
(
x(1), . . . , x(T )
)
such that x(j) = x(j) for j 6= i and x(i) = [(k + x(i) + y(i) − y˜(i)) mod k]. Similarly,
x˜ =
(
x˜(1), . . . , x˜(T )
)
such that x˜(j) = x˜(j) for j 6= i and x˜(i) = [(k + x˜(i) + y(i) − y˜(i)) mod k]. Since x and x˜
are neighboring databases, then x and x˜ are also neighboring databases. Step (a) follows from the assumption
that y satisfy (83). From the basic step along with the induction step, we conclude that the mechanism Q
given in (82) is -DP-Rec mechanism. Hence, the proof is completed.
I.1 Proof of The First Necessary Condition (|U| ≥ |YT | ≥ |X T |) of Theorem 6
We prove it in two parts: first we show |YT | ≥ |X T |, and then we show |U| ≥ |YT |.
|YT | ≥ |X T |: Note that the output is a deterministic function of the input and the random key, i.e.,
Y T = f(XT , U) for some deterministic function f . This implies that, for any fixed u ∈ U , the function f (x, u)
should generate a different output y ∈ YT for different values of x ∈ X T , which implies that |YT | ≥ |X T |.
|U| ≥ |YT |: Let Y (x) ⊆ YT be a subset of outputs such that the input XT = x is mapped with non-zero
probability to every y ∈ Y (x). We claim that Y (x) = YT for all x ∈ X T for any -DP-Rec mechanism. In
other words, we claim that each input x ∈ X T should be mapped with non-zero probability to every output
y ∈ YT . We prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two neighboring x,x′ ∈ X T such
that Y (x) 6= Y (x′). Thus, there exists y ∈ Y (x) \ Y (x′) or y ∈ Y (x′) \ Y (x). Hence, we have Q(y|x)Q(y|x′) →∞
or
Q(y|x′)
Q(y|x) →∞ which violates the privacy constraints. Therefore, Y (x) = Y (x′) = YT for all x,x′ ∈ X T .
Given x ∈ X T , we have that |Y (x) | ≤ |U|, where |U| is the maximum number of possible keys. Thus, the
random key size is at least the same as the output size: |U| ≥ |YT |. Hence, the first condition of Theorem 6
is necessary to design an -DP-Rec mechanism.
J Proof of Lemma 9
Let gi = i (k)
(T−1)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Observe that databases x1, . . . ,xg1 have x(1) = 1 and the databases
xg1+1, . . . ,xg2 have x
(1) = 2. Generally, the databases xgi−1+1, . . . ,xgi have x
(1) = i. Let Ci =
∑gi
a=gi−1+1 P
y
a
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for i ∈ [k]. Consider the following inequalities that we will prove next
H (Py) = −
kT∑
a=1
Pya log (P
y
a )
=
k∑
i=1
Ci
− gi∑
a=gi−1+1
Pya
Ci
log
(
Pya
Ci
)− k∑
i=1
Ci log (Ci) (86)
≥
k∑
i=1
CiH (Umin,T−1)−
k∑
i=1
Ci log (Ci)) (87)
≥
k∑
i=1
CiH (Umin,T−1) +H (Umin,1) (88)
= H (Umin,T−1) +H (Umin,1) (89)
We begin with inequality (87). Observe that the kT−1 databases xgi−1+1, . . . ,xgi have the same value of
the first sample x(1) = i, and hence these kT−1 databases cover all possible databases in X T−1. Consider
a random variable UT−1 drawn according to the distribution PT−1 =
[
Pygi−1+1
Ci
, . . . ,
Pygi
Ci
]
. This is a valid
distribution with support size kT−1. Furthermore, since the distribution Py is -DP, then the distribution
PT−1 is also -DP. From Lemma 8, the random key UT−1 can be used to construct an -DP-Rec mechanism
with the possibility to recover the databases XT−1 =
(
x(2), . . . , x(T )
)
from the output of the mechanism and
the random key UT−1. Hence, we get
H
(
UT−1
) ≥ H (Umin,T−1) . (90)
This proves inequality (87). Now, observe that databases xi,xg1+i, . . . ,xgk−1+i are neighboring databases for
each i ∈ [kT−1], since they are only different in the value of the first sample x(1). Since the mechanism Q is
-DP-Rec, we have
e− ≤ P
y
ga+i
Pygj+i
≤ e ∀a, j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} (91)
Thus, we get
e− ≤
∑ga
i=ga−1+1 P
y
i
e
∑ga
i=ga−1+1 P
y
i
≤ Ca
Cj
=
∑ga
i=ga−1+1 P
y
i∑gj
i=gj−1+1 P
y
i
≤ e

∑gj
i=gj−1+1 P
y
i∑gj
i=gj−1+1 P
y
i
≤ e ∀a, j ∈ [k] (92)
Consider a random key U1 that has a distribution C = [C1, . . . , Ck], where Ca =
∑ga
i=ga−1+1 P
y
i . From
Lemma 6, the random key U1 can be used to construct an -LDP-Rec mechanism with the possibility to
recover the sample X1 from the output of the mechanism and the random key U
1. Hence from Theorem 4,
we have
H
(
U1
) ≥ H (Umin,1) . (93)
This proves inequality (88), and completes the proof of Lemma 9.
K Proof of Lemma 13
For the random variable U ′, the distribution q′ =
[
q′1, . . . , q
′
m−1
]
is given by
q′j =
qj
1− qm . (94)
35
Note that the distribution q′ is a valid distribution on U ′ since
∑m−1
j=1 q
′
j =
∑m−1
j=1
qj
1−qm = 1. Now, we can
bound the difference between H (U)−H (U ′) as follows
H (U)−H (U ′) =
m−1∑
j=1
q′j log
(
q′j
)− m∑
j=1
qj log (qj)
=
m−1∑
j=1
qj
1− qm log
(
qj
1− qm
)
−
m∑
j=1
qj log (qj)
=
m−1∑
j=1
qj
1− qm
[
log
(
qj
1− qm
)
− log
(
q
(1−qm)
j
)]
− qm log (qm)
=
m−1∑
j=1
qj
1− qm
[
− log
(
1− qm
qqmj
)]
− qm log (qm)
> − log
m−1∑
j=1
q
(1−qm)
j
− qm log (qm) (95)
≥ − (1− qm) log (1− qm)− qm log (m− 1)− qm log (qm) (96)
≥ min
(
0, log
(
m
m− 1
))
(97)
≥ 0 (98)
where (95) follows from the fact that − log (.) is a strictly convex function and qj/1− qm > 0 for j ∈ [m− 1].
The inequality (96) follows from solving the convex problem
max
{qj}m−1j=1
m−1∑
j=1
q
(1−qm)
j
s.t.
m−1∑
j=1
qj = 1− qm
qj ≥ qm ∀j ∈ [m− 1]
(99)
Note that xa is a concave function on x ∈ R+ for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Therefore, the objective function
in (99) is concave in {qj}. By solving the optimization problem in (99), we get q∗j = 1−qmm−1 ≥ qm
for all j ∈ [m− 1] and ∑m−1j=1 q(1−qm)j ≤ (1−qm)(1−qm)(m−1)(−qm) . Since log (x) is a monotonic function, we get
− log
(∑m−1
j=1 q
(1−qm)
j
)
≥ − (1− qm) log (1− qm)− qm log (m− 1). The inequality (97) follows from the fact
that − (1− qm) log (1− qm)− qm log (m− 1)− qm log (qm) = H (qm)− qm log (m− 1) is a concave function
of qm. The minimum of a concave function is one of the vertices, where qm ∈ {0, 1m}. Hence, the proof is
completed.
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